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CHAPTF.R I 
THF. NATURF. OF THF. PROBLEM 
The problem of the metaphysical status of value has been 
)/ prominent in philosophical thought since the turn of the presen 
,I 
,I 
:I 
il li 
i: 
' 
century. It has been inherent in philosophy since man first 
reasoned, but its peculiar importance has only recently become 
explicit. The question of whether value is objective or 
I ~ 
i [' subjective is the center of the problem, which has many 
il 
II :; ramifications such as the nature of God, for instance. 
,, 
': :; However, the main discussion concerns subjectivity and object-
ivity. Those who insist upon the objectivity of value say 
I: that it is metaphysically objective in the universe, and we 
,, 
~ I 
I: simply recognize it and use it. For example, a beautiful oil 
painting expresses a standard of beauty quite independent of 
ii 
I' 
:: any person's judgment. Thus the picture is beautiful whether 
" 
,. 
I• 
;' or not the unskilled eye recognizes it as such. Beauty is 
'I 
1: 
!: 
,, I; 
i, 
!, 
ii 
tl 
[1 
' ,, 
beauty even when it is concealed. Furthermore, if the 
standards of beauty are subjective, as may be claimed, then 
there should be no agreement as to what is beautiful such as 
we find among present-day critics. If beauty is objective, 
any dissent from ita standards by individuals would not affect 
its status, either. So far we have discussed only beauty, but 
what is true of beauty, usually considered the stronghold of 
. :· :-··:.···-·-·:·:-.-::: == ___ -·;-;t: ::;" --- - _,,. -.-"":"'' ------ --~ -: 
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II 
i 
:1 subjectivism, is also true of goodness and truth, and whatever 
:I 
:: other values there may be. 
'I 
There are few thinkers who would 
~ I 
:i make truth 
I. 
subjective as they do in the case of beauty and 
Those who believe in the objectivity of value make II !I goodness. 
!I 
' 
:1 goodness ·and beauty as objective as truth. ;, ,, 
:i 
jl 
•I 
li ;I In contrast to these objectivists are those who hold a 
II ;i subjective theory of value. Baaing their claims upon the fact 
' ;; li that value never seems to exi at apart from interest, they say 
I' 
:i that value rests upon our individual interpretation of it. 
:i 
., 
Beauty is that which appeals to us individually. 
i< 
II 
II ,. 
Goodness is 
not objective but is only that which has been recognized 
i 
!I th 
,. roughout the years as the common good. The case for the 
,: 
,, 
.. : ~
,: 
,I 
I' 
\! 
i' 
:! 
II 
,I 
:I 
subjectivity of value is vulnerable at one point, as we have 
already seen. Those who support it are unwilling to make 
truth also subjective, for to do so would be to affirm 
solipsism. Accordingly, those philosophers who take the view 
that value is objective criticize the subjective view for 
resting its claims on an objective theory of truth when the 
distinction between truth on one hand and beauty and goodness 
on the other seems as unfounded as the distinction between 
subjectivity is still strong. The solution to the problem 
once and for all is impossible, yet every person must act as 
··•jr .. :· . . ·= ~-·::. :::·· .. :·:=-.-· . ·-
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though his mind was 
I 
I 
li 
I' 
made up for all time. Like the problem of j1 
iGod, the 
I 
I 
,growing. 
I 
problem of value is one in which truth keeps on 
,, 
'· 
1: 
I! il 
I' I! 
,I ,, 
., 
The problem of the nature of value takes us further than !: 
j! 
" 
,: 
:I 
t: 
I· 
1: 
I! 
1: 
II 
a discussion of subjectivity and objectivity, however. There f• a certain sense in which the problem of value underlies the 
jhole of philosophy. If value is understood to be equivalent 
ito meaning, and this observation seems valid, then we have to 
II 
We have already indicated J! !ask the meaning of philosophy itself. 
l!the relation between value and truth, truth being made a value i! ,, 
; 
~Y almost every philosopher. 
' I 
There is much lees agreement in 
~he other fields, however. In the field of aesthetics there 
I 
1
occurs the sharpest break between the subjectivists and the 
jbjectivists. Likewise, in the field of morals the lack of 
~greement is evident today in the opposition between good as a 
: 
~common projection and good as a standard binding upon the 
I jindividual, the categorical 1ought'. The problem of value, 
~herefore, deserves a place as one of the problems which all 
I philosophy must face. 
I 
I 
I 
The problem of value runs throughout the history of 
I 
Philosophy, but it did 
I 
not become explicit as a separate prob-
" 'I 
,i 
'I ~ 
I' 
j! 
ii 
1: 
I' ,,
ll 
II 
ii 
!i 
'·• 
I' 
1,: 
" 
I 
il 
i: 
:I 
lj 
'I 
~em until Munsterberg, in Germany, gave it il a new interpretation. ·1 I! 
•j ;, With the publication of his Eternal Values in 1909 in English, 
,I 
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!; 
I 
i: 
!i the importance of this problem made itself felt in England and 
!i ii the United States, the latter country furnishing moat of the 
I; 
!i discussion at the present time. W. M. Urban, an American
1
, 
rl 
!i idealistic philosopher who studied in Germany under Munoterberg,! 
,, 
!i published his Valuation in the same year as his teacher 
il 
:! published his Eternal Values, and this was the first American 
1: 
!I book on the subject of value. His whole development was 
il derived largely from the Vienna school, led by Meinong and his 
: fellow-worker Ehrenfels. Since that time, axiology has 
i! 
!! constantly been before the minds of all thinkers. The 
I' !I 
11 development of pragmatism in the United States by William James 
•I 
ij served to make that country the leader in the philosophy of 
I 
1/ value, because value became a term which the average man 
1/ 
i/ could use and understand, thus keeping the problem constantly 
ll before men's minds. Thus the recent trend towards a theory of II 
II ;i 
!; value had its ori~in in Germany and Austria and its main 
il 
:•, development in the United States. 
! 
,: 
!I 
!I 
However, next to the United States, England has 
!i the meat influential theories of value. 
H 
~ I 
produced 
solely by German philosophy because !: not need to be at imulated 
ji 
jl it had a tradition of ita own. The problem of value was 
,, 
::clearly set forth in the ethical philosophy of T. H. Green. 
i! i: He gave a basis for much British philosophy which was to follow :; ,_ 
1: him, ao it is almost impossible to read and understand any 
I' 
I 
I 
II 
I 
. I 
9 
' !, 
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:.1 
!i Brit ish philosophy without first having read and under stood 
;: 
il 
:I the philosophy of Green. 
,, 
Accordingly, when Munsterberg and 
!: 
:r his school brought forth their new emphasis, the revival in !i 
It 
:, 
I· 
li 
1i !I 
I 
i! 
il 
I 
British philosophy was not nearly so extensive as in American 
philosophy, because in England men had already been thinking 
about the problem whereas it was new to American thinkers. 
Therefore, although value theory has a longer tradition in 
England, the importance of the problem is felt keenly in the 
United State a. 
j! Having the history of the problem before us, we now 
~~ turn our at tent ion to the sources from which this and the 
:r II 1 following material has been taken. These sources are many and 
II 
., 
1: varied. The basic source is the two volume edition of li 
1: 
i! Contemporary British Philosophy edited by J. H. Muirhead. 
i! 
li These two volumes served the purpose of limiting the field. 
,I 
!l 
il Starting with the articles in this two volume work, we 
:I ,, 
j; turned to other pr~mary sources written by the men who had 
li 
,: discussed the problem of value. These primary sources consist 
p 
;, 
,, not only of books but also of articles in current journals of ;! 
,, 
I• philosophy. To these were added many secondary sources, used 
I 
;; as commentaries on the men studied. 
: 
As will be seen, the 
I· 
il field has been limited to those philosophers who are directly ' 
'I i 
!t :1 1: concerned with the problem of value, especially the following: II 
!i G. E. Moore, Laird, Alexander, Boaanquet, Sorley, and II 
-----=- -;:1 
10 
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Mackenzie. It is impossible in a study of this type to go into 
detail about all the men, eo we must confine our attention to 
these few who are outstanding and typical. 
The method followed in this thesis is that of comparison 
and contrast of individual theories. Each chapter of this dis-
cussion deale with a special problem of the whole. In each 
chapter the representative theories of outstanding men will be 
discussed and criticized. The selection of men depends on 
whether or not they are typical of the group. Moreover, the 
men discussed in each chapter will vary according to whether 
or not they treat with that special phase of the problem. 
Within each chapter we shall point out the relationships and 
contrasts of each theory with the others, and at the same time 
try to discover some conclusions for our own use. 
The thesis is divided into nine sections, eight chapters 
and a summary. The first chapter has been concerned with the 
nature of the problem. The second chapter deale with the 
"Definability of Value". This problem of definition comes 
first, both logivally and chronologically. Following from the 
problem of definition is the interpretation of value as 
~~ consisting of the 'ought', so our third chapter deals with the 
"Normative Character of Value". Having settled some of the 
problems as to what value is, we next turn our attention to 
. I 
I 
l 
I, 
\! 
the implications of that theory. This means that we must 
I I elucidate the importance of the problem as felt by philosophers 
I 
·and illustrated by their "Approaches to Value Theory", which 
constitutes the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, we 
discuss what each thinker considers the highest good to be, 
or, as it is called, "The Summum Bonum". The sixth chapter 
deals with the important subject of "Subjective and Objective 
Value". The seventh chapter, "Value and Evil", deals with 
that part of experience which reveals both value and disvalue 
to us. The final chapter serves as a climax because it 
treats the important problem of "Value and Existence". The 
Summary at the end consists of conclusions reached. 
II 
12 
13 
. ----=--=-=-=-,i ____ o_-=-=:_ ______________ --- . ---------- -- ---~---------------- --
1 
- -···- --- --- . 
. . - -- - ·- . -
CHAPTER II 
THE DF.FINABILITY OF VALUE 
In undertaking a study of any subject, the first thing 
to be done is to arrive at a definition of terms to be used in 
the study. Judging by this standard, one might expect our first 
step to be a definition of the terru value. However, this 
: problem of value drives home a point which some investigators 
are prone to overlook. When we start with a definition, we 
too often are assuming the very thing the study is designed to 
prove. Then the study itself is useless because we have made 
up our minds before we began. The proper use of any definition 
/is for a point of departure. Nothing should prevent us from 
pursuing our study with an open mind. 
In the field of the theory of value, however, there are 
/ some thinkers who object even to beginning with a definition 
of value on the ground that any study of value has as its goal 
this very definition. To define value at the outset is to 
thereby assume the whole discussion which aims at the discovery 
of what value really is. Some even maintain that the nature of 
the problem of value is such that no one can define value, 
anyway, and to do eo is to assume a false theory about value. 
Thus G. E. Moore says: 
[ : 
- - ----:-:..:.----- --=--= ____ -,- -----:_l- ::-.::_-_-::_::: ____ -__ -,:-:-::. 
" 
,, 
H 
: 
'~ 
i 
'I 
I 
,I 
.! 
'! 
------------------------------~~~~~=-~=======-----~~----~~·~ 
i
i 
If I am asked 'What is good?' ~Y answer is that good 
is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I 
am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is 
that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to 
say about it.l 
This statement is not so dogmatic as it sounds outside of its 
context, for Moore is asserting that the only method is that of 
analysis. "We cannot define anything except by analyais.n2 
Granting him this assumption, we must agree with his contention 
that value cannot be defined, when he says: 
You can give a definition of a horae, because a horse 
has many different properties and qualities, all of 
which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated 
them all, when you have reduced a horae to hie simplest 
terms, then you can no longer define those terms.3 
This assumption of Moore's rests entirely upon the fact 
that he limits himself to the analytic method, a limitation 
which seems entirely out of place in a study of value. When-
ever we speak of an object as possessing value, we mean, at 
least, that it has meaning. The relation between meaning and 
the method of analysis certainly is not very close. For 
example, if we were to analyze the process of throwing a ball, 
we would find that the action consisted of a series of~_·reflexes 
[ and muscular reactions. If we analyzed still further, we 
il------il 1 Moore, PE, 6. 
will be found in 
a Moore, PE, 10. 
3 Moore, PE, 7 • 
Note: The key to this and subsequent footnotes 
the Bibliography. 
14 
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I 
l ! 
: 
'· 
II 
might resolve the whole process into a movement of atoms. Such 
a procedure would have value for the scientist, but it would 
not bring us any nearer to a conception of what that value 
I 
! consisted than our conception when we started. If, on the other 
I 
i· 
hand, we lay aside our method of analysis in favor of one of 
synthesis which analyzes but goes much further, we then ask 
what was the purpose or meaning behind the throwing of the 
ball. Immediately the problem assumes a new form.. If the ball 
I was thrown to strike out a batter, the action has meaningj but 
if all we see in the act is a surge of atoms, then we are un-
able to see any value in the act. In looking for meaning, we 
are no longer studying for the sake of studying, but we are 
studying so that we may understand. Therefore, we now discover 
that Moore's assertion that the method should be that of 
I analysis is entirely unfounded, and a method which is barren 
: 
!~ for a search for value. If we grant him hie premise that the 
:: 11 only method is that of analysis, then we cannot define value. I 
Neither can we define anything else by that method. Definition 
is more than mere enumeration of parts and implies·a "for 
something or someone," so if we deny Moore's method, we deny 
1 
hie non-definability of value. 
! 
Laird agrees with Moore in eo far as a definition of 
value by the method of analysis is impossible, but he does not 
make analysis the sole method. Therefore, in a footnote in 
I 
.I 
15 
i 
I 
:I 
which he discusses Moore's concept, he says: 
Personally I cannot but agree with him here (speaking 
of Moore's statement that the good cannot be defined 
because it is unanalyzable) •••• Again, "definable" 
may, logically and with full appropriateness, be con-
ceived in many ways, and need not be taken to be the 
same as "analysable" at all. Many writers, indeed, 
appear to mean that to be "definable" is simply to-
be-equivalent-to, and ••• in this sense, it may be 
argued that • • • any account of what value is-
equivalent-to is therefore a definition. If, (sic) 
so every moral theory would "define" good.4 
sense as the notion of 'yellow' is simple: 
••• 'Good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is 
a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any 
manner of means, explain to any one who does not 
already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot 
explain what good is.S 
Nevertheless, our understanding of yellow does not depend upon 
the various sensory stimuli which arouse a sense of yellowness 
in our eye. In fact, yellow thus considered is not a simple 
notion at all, for what yellow really is when it is analyzed 
is a series of mental experiences which are our very own and 
4 Laird, SMT, 95. 
5 Moore, PE, 7. 
---------- . _, 
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:which set up a reaction in the muscles of the eye. When Moore 
j says that yellow is a simple, he is employing more than the 
1
jmethod of analysis. He is treating the sensations which he 
/has of yellow as a synthesis. Now if we translate Moore's 
statement in the light of this discussion, we discover him 
saying that it is nmposeible to pursue the method of analysis 
and the method of synthesis at one and the same time. There-
fore, hie view of value as indefinable becomes a tautology. 
The contradiction involved here is furthe~ illustrated by 
Moore's statement that the good oan be defined, but good 
cannot. He says, "I believe the good to be definable; and yet 
I still say that good itself is indefinable. n6 The question 
whether or not he is justified in drawing such a distinction 
between good and goodness must be reserved for a later chapter. 
The importance of this problem of definition, which 
Moore feels, is not shared by Laird. Moore wished to make 
sure that no one would think his theory of value was subjec-
tive by thinking that he made value to depend upon feeling.? 
Good for him is not the same as the good. On the other hand, 
Laird's practical ethical interest leads him to deny the 
importance of knowing what values are and to take the problem 
6 Moore, PE, 9. 
7 Moore, PE, 7. 
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of definition much more lightly, when he says: 
I should like to explain, however, that the defina-
bility of the concept "good" seems to me to be seldom 
a problem of major importance, and usually to be 
definitely of very monor moment •••• The essential 
point is the irreducibility of values to non-valuea.S 
However, the definition of value cannot be tossed off 
eo lightly. Certainly the histoty of thought shows that every 
person holds some definition of value, even if it be that 
value is indefinable. Plato understood value in terms of hie 
Ideas, Hobbes the State, Spinoza in terms of God, and in like 
manner every philosopher. Values are those things for which 
we strive and seek, and if we do no~ know at all what they are, 
how can we search for them, let alone comprehend and under-
stand them? We often think of an invention as a creation of 
something out of nothing. This is not the case, however, for 
every inventor starts with some hypothesis which he tests. He 
does not go into hie laboratory and simply jumble together 
whatever his hand may chance upon. He has an idea as to what 
he is going to do and what he is going to use to achieve that 
goal. When Thomas A. Edison was testing different materials 
for the filament in hie electric light bulb, he had to try 
many materials, but each material had a characteristic which 
~~ recommended it to him as a possible medium which would heat 
8 Laird, SMT, 95. 
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'without being consumed. Likewise, you must know what you are 
doing in regard to values. If you do not know what values 
are, how can you be sure that they are not what Laird calls 
non-values? We must have some definition, especially in a 
science as exacting as philosophy. 
Bosanquet not only takes the problem of definition 
seriously, but he also thinks that a definition is possible. 
Since he is an absolute idealist, he defines value in terms of 
the whole of reality. The problem of whether or not he has 
the right to identify value with reality arises here, but 
since we are now discussing strictly the definition of value, 
the problem of value and reality will be reserved for the 
final chapter which deals with value and existence. However, 
Boeanquet does define value in terms of the whole, as he says, 
"· •• Logic, or the spirit of totality, is'the clue to 
reality, value, and freedom."9 He finds in hie thought that 
it is impossible to explain anything without reference to the 
complete situation in which that event occurs. This is in 
direct contrast with the method pursued by Moore. Moore re-
duced value to its simplest, whereas Boeanquet interprets 
value in its most complex and highest form. "The 'good' of 
,t, the universe must be such as belongs to a world and not to the 
9 Bosanquet, PIV, 23. 
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member of one.nlO The logic of Bosanquet 1 s system equates 
value with the Absolute. Since the Absolute is the ultimate 
reality 1 value depends thereon 1 upon the nearness to the 
Whole. 
The question may arise as to the validity of Bosanquet's 
argument that value can be understood only when interpreted in 
the light of the whole. There are those who deny that the 
whole has any meaning apart from the meaning of its parte. 
The outcome of the argument involved here must determine 
whether we are to define by analyzing or by synthesizing, or 
by both. Already we have seen that a complex object lends 
itself to definition more readily than does a simple object if 
we define its meaning. The problem as to whether or not the 
whole has values of ita own is an extension of the problem of 
definition. Let us take water as an example of something to 
be defined. Are we to define water in terms of its component 
parta 1 H201 or by what it is used for? In other words 1 does 
water possess properties of its own apart from the combined 
properties of the two parte of hydrogen and one part oxygen? 
The first thing to be noted is that hydrogen and oxygen assume 
different forms in water than when they are free, but the 
'~ proof that the whole has ita own values need not rest upon 
10 Bosanquet 1 PIV 1 24. 
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this fact. However, anyone given the proper mixture of 
hydrogen and oxygen would never be able to predict just what 
the resulta would be. None of the uses of water such as for 
drinking, washing, et cetera, are even implied in the formula 
i H20. Therefore, if value is to be defined by giving its 
I 
meaning, it must be defined in relation to the whole. Value is 
to be measured by metaphysical perfection. 
There are two objections which may be raised at this 
point against Bosanquet 1s definition. The first is that 
value loses all its meaning when identified with the 
whole of reality. If it means everything, then there is 
nothing distinctive about it. Nor is there any reason why we 
should speak of value at all. It simply becomes another name 
for reality and its use serves only to confuse the issue. 
However, Bosanquet attempts to meet this objection, when he 
says, "· •• In our attitude to experience ••• we are ••• 
to take for our standard what man recognizes as value when 
his life is fullest and his soul at its highest stretch.nll 
By this he means that value is a quality rather than a 
quantity of a certain thing. The quality of value should 
belong to reality, and this does not mean the whole, or value, 
~- includes everything. Value is the highest quality in reality. 
11 Bosanquet, PIV, 3. 
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i! A second objection seems more pressing than does the 
i' first. Bosanquet emphasizes the necessity for appealing to il 
•I 
!I i the whole of reality, and we saw that the whole may have value ,, 
ii 
not included in the sum of all its parts. Now, however, we 
must recognize the fact that the parts have values which the 
whole does not have. Thus if we take the formula for water 
again, the hydrogen and oxygen as parts may be combined in 
various proportions or under different conditions, and the 
resulting product will not be water. Thus those parts have 
a certain flexibility and freedom which water as a whole does 
not have. Therefore, we must be fair and state that value 
depends upon the whole only when the whole takes into account 
the values of its parts. Bosanquet seems to forget that the 
parts have values when he says that finite persons are not 
ultimate values,l2 and that finite consciousness is an inade-
1: 
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quate basis for a theory of value.l3 
II ,, 
On the other hand, he is Jj 
il 
eager to show that the Absolute does not stand unrelated to 
life, as he says, "· •• Repudiate this ultimate abnegation 
which treats the great philosophies as abstractions alien to 
·I 
,, 
II 
life.nl4 He makes another significant statement when he says, I 
"The great enemy of all sane idealism is the notion that the 
12 Bosanquet, PIV, 20. 
13 Bosanquet, PIV, 123. 
14 Bosanquet, PIV, 13. 
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I ideal belongs to the future. •15 
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When we take Bosanquet's 
system as a whole, howe~er, his emphasis upon the Absolute 
tends to obscure the distinctive qualities of value and to 
disregard the importance of the parts which compose the 
Absolute. Of course, to say that the parts of the Absolute 
have value not contained in the Absolute is a contradiction 
of Bosanquet's contention, but the fault lies with the 
Absolute and not with the value of the parts. 
A few words should be said concerning the criterion of 
value, for that is implied in any definition. The only one 
possible is that of coherence, the same as for truth. When 
we perceive a new truth, we are unable to tell whether or not 
it is true until we have fitted it into the body of· truth we 
already possess. Every fact comes to us with the_claim to bein 
true, so we have to.judge each one. This we can do only by 
seeing whether ot not they cohere with other facta we know are 
true. Values work the same way. Ever·y value-judgment claims 
to be true, yet conflicting judgments show us that some are 
wrong. This leads Alexander to say that "what we apprehend in 
objects of value is the~r coherence.n16 Further proof that 
coherence is the only criterion is not and cannot be given here 
and is assumed. 
15 Bosanquet, PIV, 136. 
16 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 243. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF VALUE 
Passing from the problem of the definability of value, 
we face another problem concerning it, namely, that of its 
normative character. We mean by normative character that 
values have a compelling force about them in the sense that 
they ought to be achieved. Thus the problem becomes whether or 
not we can say that value ought to be followed. Is there 
something about values which attract our attention? These are 
the problems which this chapter aims to solve in so far as they 
are answered by British philosophers. Both affirmative and 
negative answers have been given to the problems, and the 
answers have been important. The problem of whether or not 
value is normative concerns our everyday life. If we deny the 
ought, then we are not compelled to follow our values; but if 
we affirm the ought, then our values are the controls in our 
life. Values, without this compulsion about them, might be 
guides but they would be devoid of all right to guide. They 
would then lose their emotional warmth as values and become 
merely things. It is ,rery difficult to work up much enthusi-
asm over a mere fact. The problem of this chapter, therefore, 
is practical in the sense that we either accept or reject 
values as the guiding factors in our life. 
i 
F 
!1 
There are contrary and confusing currents at work in 
this problem of the ought. These cross-currents are the result :: 
I of drawing too sharp distinctions between objective and sub-
1 
!, 
•: 
I jective value. 
•i I; Those who hold an objective theory of value set !i 
!! 
values over against our recognition of them. Having done this, 
11 they then face the problem of how to recover the normative 
H 
'i 
li character of value. If· an ideal is too far away and cut off 
jl completely from us, we feel no compulsion to follow it. Thus 1: ,, 
I 1 an extreme emphasis upon the objectivity of value, upon which 
lj I; 
!l 
II 
II 
lite normative character depends, tends to destroy that 
normative character. On the other hand, subjective theories 
of value stimulate this feeling of oughtness because they 
make value arise from within us and a part of us which we 
should develop. Yet this subjective interpretation of value 
is not an adequate basis for the normative character. There 
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I j! 
J! 
!I 
'• 
'I ~ ! 
il 
II 
li 
" ii 
J' 
i! 
,, 
:I 
I 
must be an objective reference if the oughtness is justified. ji 
H 
Since the result of this conflict is confusion in the minds of /j 
'I many, it indicates the importance of the problem as to whether lj 
I, 
value is subjective or objective. 
il 
II Laird is one of those who affirm value to be normative. !' :j 
" 'i 
He says: :~ 
(~ A reason which shows that a given action ought to be 
1 performed is a reason in terms of value •••• Duties 
I 
are unconditional demands, categorical imperatives, 
self-satisfying injunctions. To suppose that these 
1 injunctions are justified only because they are good 
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,I 
for something else, is to smirch and to flout them; 
for they are sovereign in their own right.l 
In other words, value, which Laird interprets as goodness, is 
,I 
;1 
,, 
'I 
ii 
I 
Ji 
II 
'I ~ I 
., 
the ought and the ought is value. II The thing that ought to be !I 
II 
done is the beat thing that can be done. 1: Laird is careful to ~ 
I' draw the distinction between the ought character and the moral !: 
/I 
character. Morals must not be confused with the good because 
they concern our response to the ought and not the ought 
itself: 
Values and excellent pursuits, in short, may be, and 
very often are, entirely non-moral, and these non-moral 
excellences become relevant to morals only when we 
raise the question of promoting or renouncing them.2 
Laird here shows an insight into the problem which many have 
missed. Morale are our own activities toward the normative 
character of value. They cannot be divorced from value, but 
neither are they value itself. They are our subjective 
relation to the good. 
Laird thus draws a difference between the knowledge of 
and the response to good and evil. Knowledge is the prereq-
uisite to doing good, and so, in a sense, La~rd agrees with 
the Socratic teaching concerning knowledge as the basis for 
all ethics, when he says, "· •• 
1 Laird, SMT, 20. 
2 Laird, SMT, xi. 
It is clear that no one can 
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lbe commanded to do anything unless he can understand the 
command."3 Even before the time of Socrates, this was placed 
in maxim form by Thales and was carved on the Temple of Apollo 
at Delphi and which read "Know Thyself." The interpretation 
of Socrates as meaning knowledge is a prerequisite to ethics 
seems sounder to me than the interpretation that everyone 
who knows the good will do it. Socrates was too much a 
student of human nature to believe anything like that. Like 
him, Laird insists that knowledge of value is something which 
stands by itself and which prec~des morale both logically and 
chronologically, and which keeps duty from becoming a blind 
force: 
What is relevant to the 1 ought 1 is not a mere human 
characteristic, peculiar to the species like leprosy 
or nakedness, but the intrinsic appropriateness of a 
certain response to the knowledge of good and evil.4 
Moreover, Laird does not allow the break between theory and 
practice which his theory might be subject to. His position 
is what we might style the synthetic view, for he says, "The 
relation between value and obligation is precisely that 
synthetic connection • • • whereby a principle applicable to 
practice also becomes a practical principle.n5 Therefore, 
Laird makes the normative character the link between the 
3 Laird, SMT, 210. 
4 Laird, SMT, 24-25. 
5 Laird, SMT, 35. 
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metaphysically objective values such as truth, beauty, and 
goodness and our subjective response to these. The ought is 
tt the link between values and morale. 
The reason why Laird confines himself chiefly to a dis-
cussion of the relation between the normative character of 
value and morale is that he confines the ought category to 
I morals alone. The normative character of value is ethics: 
I 
i Pure axiology (or the science of all values) 
cannot be the same thing as ethics. In the first 
place it is far too wide. The values of truth, 
beauty, and happiness would be included in this 
science, each on ita own merits; and these taken 
simpliciter (or without addition and qualification) 
are not what we mean by morale. These values are 
relevant to morality only when they carry with 
them a certain authority for action and direct or 
prescribe what ought to come about.6 
It is true that we moat often think of duty in terms of 
morals, but there is no metaphysical basis for this. Truth 
and beauty contain an imperative just as much as does good-
neas.7 However, truth and beauty are subordinate to goodness 
in the sense that morals are concerned with the application 
n 
. . . The justification of every of every imperative. 
imperative is entirely a moral question.n8 But Laird goes 
even futther than this and says that the imperative of the 
e 6 Laird, SMT, 196. 
7 See The Ultimate Belief by A. Clutton-Brock. 
8 Laird, SMT, 28. 
28 
As he says: 
In short, we are bound to maintain that every 
imperative, every norrua~ive injunction, is in reality 
moral. The artistic or the scientific conscience, as 
we call them, really are instances of conscience in a 
literal, straightforward, and therefore in an entirely 
moral sense.9 
It is from this reasoning that Laird draws his conclusion that 
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goodness is the summum bonum, but that is a subject for a later !i 
I 
chapter. We now see that the normative character of value 
means for Laird the moral character of value, although it is 
"not the whole of morals.•lO It is for that reason that he 
I discusses morals as the justification of imperatives. 
I 
There is a serious difficulty involved here as to 
I whether or not Laird is justified in making all normative 
character moral. He states the problem squarely, but his 
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answer to the problem is an assumption rather than a solution, 
when he says: 
9 
10 
There is a suspicion, indeed, in many quarters that 
intellectual and moral excellences very seldom go to-
gether, and that artistry and morality touch very 
shyly if at all. This may, or may not, be a preju-
dice. What is important for our purposes is to 
notice (despite the paradox) that this rejoinde;, 
even if it were true, may nevertheless be irrelevant. 
Laird, SMT, 31. 
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1 What beauty decrees for its own sake it decrees ii 
j morally, and the behests of truth are moral behests. :: 
They are moral although they are not the whole of '1 
II morale .11 
1 This abrupt assumption concerning moral imperatives certainly 
J does not prove the point under debate. In fact 1 the contrary // I 'I 
1 
point of view that there is a truth and aesthetic as well as a ~~ 
moral conscience can be asserted with more force. In the 
first place, there is no empirical evidence that man is more 
moral than he is truthful or appreciative of the beautiful. 
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Rather, the prejudice seems to lie at Laird's door. The moral )I 
imperative seems more significant because it is social, while 
the truth imperative and the aesthetic imperative concern 
primarily the individual. Secondly, to reduce truth and 
beauty to sub-heads under goodness destroys them. Goodness 
must meet the standards of truth and beauty in exactly the 
same degree as truth and beauty must meet the standards of 
goodness. Each is valid in its own right. Notice that this 
statement does not commit us as to whether or not we can 
measure one by the other. Nevertheless, the value-ought is 
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wider than the moral-ought. 
i 
I' 
The artist should paint for art's I' 
I 
sake alone, for to do otherwise would lessen the quality of 
II 
his work. Even if he painted for morality's sake, it would be 1/ 
li in the same sense as though he painted for the sake of the 
i profit to be derived from the sale of the picture, and it 
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would not be a masterpiece. The artist must be free to create ;I 
" 
if he is to produce the finest of which he is capable. The 
I 
/same holds true for logic. The laws of reason stand in their 
/own right and we experience their compulsion without ·any 
/reference to morale. It is difficult to see how anyone can 
/ say that the law of mathematics which compels us to say that 
ltwo times two equals four haa any moral quality about it. We 
I lmay conclude,.therefore, that Laird has falsely construed the 
I normative character of value when he subordinates truth and 
beauty to morale. Truth and beauty, as qualifiers of reality, 
must stand in the same relationship ae goodness. 
wise is to affirm the untenable distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities. Laird recognizes the fact of inter-
J penetration of values, but he errs in his explanation. It 
must be noted, however, that this weakness in his theory does 
not destroy the normative character of value. 
G. E. Moore's treatment of the problem of the normative 
character of value is more logical than Laird's. Moore 
recognizee the fact that what is often meant by objective is· 
this very normative character, or what he calla the intrinsic 
character: 
In the case, therefore, of ethical and aesthetic 
"goodness", I think that what those who contend for 
the "objectivity" of these conceptions really wish 
to contend for is not mere "objectivity" at all, 
------~--- -------- - ·- - .. -
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but principally and essentaally that they are 
intrinsic kinds of value.l 
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Thus Moore identifies the normative character with the intrin- 1· il 
sic character of value. He thereby avoids the fallacy into i! ,I 
d 
;I )I by narrowing the normative down to the moral. ·~ i! I which Laird fell 
1 In fact, Moore is 
I 
intrinsic quality 
more interested in the universality of the 
than in the problem of subjectivity and 
objectivity, as he says: 
For the difference that must be made to our view 
of the Universe, according as we hold that some 
kinds of value are "intrinsic" or that none are, 
is much greater than any which follows from a 
mere difference of opinion as to whether some 
are "non-subjective," or all without exception 
"subjectiven.l3 
Moore gives his definition of the normative character 
of value, therefore, in terms of intrins_ic value: 
To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means 
merely that the question whether a thing possesses 
it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends 
solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in 
question.14 
He goes on to point out that he means two things when he says 
it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in 
• • • It is impossible for what is strictly one and 
the same thing to possess that kind of value at one 
time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to 
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possess it at another; and equally impossible for it 
to possess it in one degree at one time~ or in one 
set of circumstances~ and to possess it in a different 
degree at another, or in a different set •••• It is 
impossible that of two exactly similar things one 
should possess it and the other not~ or that one 
should possess it in one degree~ and the other in a 
different one.l5 
For Moore~ then~ the normative value has a stability about it 
upon which we can always depend.. Mere feeling about value 
does not determine its intrinsic nature, but rather, we select 
true values because of their normative character. Laird 
/failed to note this distinction which Moore makes. Laird 
' based normative character upon goodness~ whereas Moore 
reverses the process and makes goodness depend upon intrinsic 
value. He says: 
And though what is meant by "objectivity" in this case~ 
is not that "right" and "wrong" are themselves intrin-
sic, what is, I think~ meant here too is that they have 
a fixed relation to a kind of value which is "intrin-
sic." It is this fixed relation to an intrinsic kind 
of value~ so far as I can see, which gives to right 
and wrong that kind and degree of fixity and im~arti­
ality which they actually are felt to possess.l6 
Moore makes goodness the supreme value but not in the 
narrow sense of morality as Laird used it. Rather~ .Moore uses 
goodness to mean that quality composed of morality~ logic, and 
aesthetics. He speaks of fo;rrhal. truth ahd ·beauty as·~ b~ing 
lS Moore, PS, 260-261. 
16 Moore, PS, 257 • 
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intrinsic in the same sense as goodness, when he says, 
I 1"· •. Though I think it is true that beauty, for instance, is 
!! 
!: 
L 
il 
I• 
\It "intrinsic," I do not see how it can be deduced from any !i 1: II 
logical law. • • .nl7 Moore is consistent throughout in 
:maintaining that value is a quality. However, he gets into 
I 
l!difficulty when he tries to distinguish between the intrinsic 
li quality of yellow and the intrinsic quality of goodness and 
I 
lbeauty. He points out that the intrinsic nature of yellow, 
goodness, and beauty differs from pleasure in kind, but to 
differentiate between the former two he admits he is unable to 
do. He only suggests "that intrinsic properties seem to 
describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a 
sense in which predicates of value never do.nl8 There seems 
1 to be a better reason for saying that value predicates differ 
I from property predicates. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
li 
II 
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!i ,, 
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;i 
il 
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!I 
Moore is unjustified in confining himself to the method of !i 
i analysis and saying that value is a simple in the same sense :I 
I as yellow is a simple. In speaking of the normative character !i 
I, 
'I 
of value, he is still pursued by the idea that value and yellow !1 
are like simples. Yet he also feels that their intrinsic 
natures are different. As long as he is consistent with his 
definition of value as a simple, he cannot solve the problem. 
I . Moore, PS, 272. 
18 Moore, PS, 274. 
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That is why he admit e his failure to do eo. However, when he 
is leas concerned with the idea of value as a simple, he gives 
the right answer when he says, "What is asserted to have 
'I II 
II ,, 
I' 
I 
I: 
I 
intrinsic value is the existence of the whole; and the exietencei 
\of the whole includee the existence of its part.nl9 He even 
I 
deviates further from his conception of value as a simple when 
II 
tl p 
II 
!l 
i' I' he says, "The value of such a whole bears no regular proportion (! 
\l 
to the sum of the values of its pa~ts.n20 We thus find Moore I' ,, 
facing this dilemma. If he is consistent 
bonception of value, he cannot answer why 
!I 
with hie basic ~ 
value in·: its intrinsic 11 
:·. jl 
.I 
nature differs from yellowness; if he takes value as being ;I . 
different from yellow, then he must regard value ·as a whole 
When Moore squarely faces the problem !instead of as a simple. 
I \Of the normative character of value, he prefers to remain 
!consistent and be unable to give an answer to the problem of 
I 
the intrinsic difference between value and yellowness. It is 
,evident from this discussion that Moore is correct only when he 
I 
!affirms the intrinsic value to be the whole. He is unable to 
!be consistent with hie notion of value as a simple because 
I . . . 
ralue is not a simple. Hie whole difficulty thus lies in the 
~osition wi~h-which he began; viz., that value is indefinable 
[and is a simple notion. 
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:! The denial of the normative character of value is 
implicit rather than explicit, evidenced by the absence of any 
treatment of the ought. Thus to omit the ought is to deny it. 
Alexander holds this position. He does not mention value as 
:, ,, 
\\ 
~ I 
j! 
r 
I' 
being normative, but rather finds two substitutes for it. 
'I I The i 
first of these is externality which he deduces from a study of 
individual experience. Since the world is external to us, it 
seems to be normative. "This distinctness of external objects 
from ourselves gives to our experience of non-mental reality 
the consciousness we have of being controlled from without or 
objectively.n21 The second substitute is derived from social 
experience. For individual minds value seems to be normative 
I, 
!I ,, 
il 
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I! jl 
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II 
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II 
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l! 
1 because it is external, but for the social mind there musjl be 1; 
1 ji 
~another criterion- universality. Therefore, Alexander says, 1 
1
: "This is the true universal! ty of moral requirement.s, that they I 
I II 
I! would be binding on any individual under such condi tiona. "22 li 
I I' 
\
Thus in place of a normative character of value, he substitutes ,, 
,, 
externality and universality. j, ,, 
However, these two substitutes cannot take the place of 
the oughtness associated with value. In the first place, they 
as much a part of normative value as of any other type, and \are 
1-----121 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 247. 
iaa Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 275. 
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1: 
In the second J! therefore do not negate the normative character. 
,I 
'I By this \; 
.I 
place, experience shows us that values are normative. 
we mean that Alexander' a theory omits the warmth of a theory of l: 
li 
We speak of physical facts il 
IJ 
value which includes the normative. 
as being cold and hard, and we are free to choose between them 
lat will. Values, however, imply a prejudice which always 
lenters into our choice. We never speak of values as we do of 
!scientific, physical facts. Then there is the further consid-
eration that if values do not compel us, why is it that we 
follow them? Why not place the scientific fact that the earth 
li 
li 
il 
•I 
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II 
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I! 
li 
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I! 
II 
II It is as much a ~~ 
fact as what we call values. We see the impossibility of this 1! 
is round at the center of our ethical system? 
~~because values attract us and call out a response from us. The Jl . 
,I 
evidence of experience offers a further proof of the ought 
category. When we examine the course of evolution, we find 
~that in the long run it is always upward. Unless there are 
objective values which have the power to draw us upward, then 
evolution should remain on the same level because the laws of 
chance are even. However, evolution does have a course which 
is always toward something higher and finer, and this fact 
\is an excellent reason 
lvalue. Therefore, not 
!adequate substitute for 
I !experience support it. 
I 
for affirming the normative character 
only is it impossible to find an 
this character, but the facts of 
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CHAPTER IV 
APPROACHES TO VALUE THEORY 
By far the most common approach to the problem of value 
is through a study of morals and ethics. In the history of 
philosophy, the study of value has been confined chiefly to 
this field of investigation. This is due for the most part 
to the fact that when we speak of value in ordinary speech, we 
almost always mean that the object is good. This prejudice in 
favor of goodness is also characteristic of philosophy, 
especially that type which tries to rely on common sense. Its 
result is to identify value with theories of morality and 
goodness, although goodness is sometimes interpreted in a much 
broader sense than the non-philosophical use (G. E. Moore). 
There is also the further reason for this limitation of value 
that goodness alone has been thought to concern our actions, 
and, therefore, the only part of values which pertains to our 
practical life is ethics, which is the science of our moral 
actions. It is only in recent philosophic thought that value 
has been perceived to be a problem apart from and more inclus-
ive than that of goodness. Value is now receiving separate 
re treatment and emphasis. In some minds it is the central 
problem of philosophy and the structure of reality may be 
constructed from a study of value (W. R. Sorley). 
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We have already seen that Moore defines value in terms 
of goodness: 
Whenever he thinks of 'intrinsic value', or 'intrinsic 
worth', or says that a thing 'ought to exist', he has 
before his mind the unique object - the uniq~e 
property of things- which I mean by 1 good 1 • 
For him the real and true value is goodness, because value con-
cerns our actions and our actions are the content for ethics. 
It is one of the duties of ethics to compare relative values 
of various goods. The values, therefore, are something 
attached to reality. Moore thinks that by a study of ethics 
we are able to arrive at a conception of the whole of value. 
In this sense his approach is from the empirical aide, because 
he relies upon common sense, although what he really means by 
common sense is intuition. Whatever his method, however, he 
does approach value from the moral aide and his theory is 
dominated by the ethical point of view. 
Laird does not aet goodness up as the supreme approach t 
value in the same sense as does Moore, but rather his emphasis 
I is broader. We saw in the preceding chapter that Laird 
identifies the normative character of value with goodness. 
Since the ought is concerned with our actions, and our actions 
I 
I are the basis for any empirical study, the study of ethics is 
the beat approach to value as a whole. Moore's reason for 
1 Moore, PE, 17. 
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I using this approach was that he identified value and good-
j ness, while Laird's approach is motivated by the fact that he 
I tries to interpret all of value through our actions. Moore, 
for all practical purposes, identified goodness and value, but 
Laird is careful to point out that "pure axiology (or the 
science of all values) cannot be the same thing as ethics.n2 
1 Truth, beauty, and goodness are ultimate values and are all on 
the same plane. The reason why goodness is preferred to the 
others as an approach to value is that it is more closely 
related to life~ If we were to grant Laird his assumption that 
the ·PUght is moral in character, an assumption which we found 
it necessary to challenge in the preceding chapter, then 
goodness would be the beet approach to value. 
Goodness, however, is not the only approach to value, 
although in many respects as we have already seen it is the 
most popular. In fact, one might say that there are as many 
approaches as there are values. The correspondence between 
what a man conceives to be the summum bonum and hie approach 
to that value is eo close that it is only by analyzing that we 
can consider one apart from the other. They are very closely 
related and to take one apart from the other is an abstraction. 
~- This will become more apparent in the next chapter when we 
a Laird, SMT, 196. 
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discuss the goals of these approaches. However, in addition 
to the moral approach there is the one through epistemology. 
It is not strange that knowledge and v~lue should be closely 
related, for there are many similarities to be found in the 
problema concerning each. In the first place, value is 
meaningless unless it is connected up with knowledge. If 
value is to enter our consciousness, it must do so through the-
medium of knowledge, for that is the medium through which all 
experience becomes our own. Thus we apeak of true value, 
meaning that value must be measured by truth (coherence) but 
also that value stands in ita own right. The second point of 
correspondence is the fact that both deal with reality. It is 
true that value applies only to a certain type of facts, while 
knowledge-treats with all facta, but both are attempts to 
relate reality to ourselves. A third characteristic which 
links knowledge and value together is that truth (the object 
of knowledge) is itself an intrinsic value. Not only does 
value receive ita validity from truth, but truth receives ita 
importance and worth from being a value. It is only in 
abstract thought that knowledge and value exist apart, not in 
concrete experience. 
Boaanquet is an excellent example of this epistemolog-
ical approach which seeks to discover value through a study of 
knowledge. He says, "· •• Logic, or the spirit of totality, 
41 
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I As he works out I 
his system and arrives at his conception of the Absolute, he 
is the clue to reality, value, and freedom."3 
~ employs the principle of inner non-contradiction which is 
purely logical in form. Anything which has any relations must 
be dependent upon something else and therefore cannot be a 
logical whole. Thus only the Absolute can po-ssess logical 
reality. This is what he means by "the spirit of totality" 
rather than a coherent interpretation of all experience. 
Bosanquet is consistent in his epistemological approach, but 
it has its weaknesses. All experience must be interpreted by 
reason, but life is broader than logic, recognizing, of 
course, that life cannot be less than logic. A purely logical 
interpretation of experience neglects other values such as 
goodness, beauty, and religious values. However, Bosanquet 
does emphasize the importance of logic consistently, and we 
must have logic, although he overlooks some valid parts of 
experience. The fact that his Absolute turns out to be an 
external form of experience and abstract proves that his 
approach is too narrow. 
A third approach to value is through an evolutionary 
theory. This is one of the most interesting methods of 
approach, even though it too becomes one-sided because it 
3 Bosanquet, PIV, 23. 
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overlooks some vi tal elements of. experience. S. Alexander, an 
emergent evolutionist, is the beet example of this type of 
approach. He sees in the evolutionary process the origin of 
values just as of various other adaptations. "Value depends 
upon adaptation and adaptation assumes the character of value 
through the rejection of the unadapted unvalues.n4 This 
application of evolution to values is unique since it is used 
as the sole approach. Other theories may use the evidence of 
evolution, but they do not make it the sole criterion of 
metaphysical reality. According to Alexander, values are 
nothing more than the products of collective society. Even 
God is only that phase of development which lies just ahead 
and constantly recedes before our advance. Enough has been 
said now to show how Alexander's approach is naturalistic in 
its evolutionary theory. It cancels out many valid objective 
experiences (prayer, worship, etc.) and inadequately explains 
others (beauty, truth, etc.). Ita limitation of value to 
instrumental values is a violation of the facta. of experience. 
S~ far we have not discussed any theory which adequately 
takes into account all the facta of experience. We now come 
to such a one which differs from the others in this respect. 
4t Whereas the others started with a particular or singular 
4 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 312. 
,, ,, 
method, W. R. Sorley begins with a comprehensive approach, that 
of ontology interpreted through moral values. He feels that 
the previous theories we have mentioned have unjustifiably 
narrowed experience and excluded facts of value. He does not 
make cognition the control as does Bosanquet,5 but rather 
reality itself which he seeks to interpret without prejudice. 
He finds three parts to reality: things and their relations, 
persons, and values. Values are a part of being just as much 
as sense-objects. 
" 
. . • The notion of value always implies a 
relation to existence - though a relation to which the natural 
sciences are indifferent."S Thus Sorley reverses the usual 
process in philosophy of value and establishes reality by the 
fact of value in the universe. His whole approach, then, is 
centered around the ontological problem. He uses this approach 
exclusively, but its very nature is inclusive. In this way he 
is using all the previously mentioned theories, and is not 
limiting experience. When he commits himself to the ontologi-
cal approach, he pledgee himself to take into consideration 
all the facts of experience. Whether or not he does this is a 
problem for later discussion, but his approach is much superior 
because of its inclusiveness than those of goodness, beauty, 
epistemology, or evolution. 
5 Sorley, l!VG, 25. 
6 Sorley, MVG, 78. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SUMMUM BONUM 
In the preceding chapter we saw how some of the British 
philosophers approached the theory of value, and we discovered 
that there are many ways. Now our purpose is to complete 
that process and study the goals up to which those approaches 
lead. It is dangerous to draw a sharp distinction between the 
approach and the goal because neither can stand alone in its 
own right. Neither can we say which definitely controls which. 
Does the method control the result, or do the ends, speaking 
through the facta of experience, determine our course? 
Probably both answers are aa much right aa they are wrong, for 
they are complementary. Form and content are hopeless abstrac-
tions when taken individually. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that philosophers conceive the summum bonum in terms of their 
methode and approaches. Recognizing the danger of abstracting 
this summum bonum, let ua now see in what terms some British 
philosophers conceive it. 
The most common classification of values is the Platmnic 
which classifies values under three heads: truth, beauty, and 
goodness. John Laird is one of those who conceives the summum 
bonum in terms of this threefold c"laaaification. Hie approach 
45 
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is through one value, goodness, but this is only because he 
thinks the normative character of value is limited to this one 
value, and he does make room for the other two. "The bonum, 
in certain respects, need not define the same field as the 
faciendum." 1 The imperative concerns only goodness and does 
not control the highest good. He says further that values 
very often are entirely non-moral and "become relevant to 
morale only when we raise the question of promoting or re-
nouncing them.n2 The assumption that value exists apart from 
our actions is very doubtful,3 but whether or not we grant him 
this assumption, he does make the highest good more inclusive 
than moral goodness. 
He makes the highest value broad enough hot ohl~--'t-.0 
include goodness but also truth and beauty, and in a special 
sense, pleasure: 
Pure axiology (or the science of all values) cannot 
be the same thing as ethics. In the first place it is 
far too wide. The values of truth, beauty, and happi-
ness would be included in this science, each on ita own 
merits; and these taken simpliciter (or without addition 
and qualification) are not what we mean by morals.4 
1 Laird, SMT, x. 
2 Laird, SMT, xi. 
~ 3 Laird feels this objection when he says, "While value and 
obligation may indeed be ultimates, they should at least be 
capable of vindicating and exhibiting their ultimacy in the 
panoply and panorama of all existence." SMT, 268. 
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The manner in which he interprets happiness. as an ultimate 
whole, then our values must satisfy our highest desires, once 
we have determined what those highest desires are. It is for 
this reason that Laird includes pleasure as a highest good. 
However, if pleasure is to be defined in such a limited sense, 
it would be better to omit it as a highest good and simply 
allow the term value to express that qualified satisfaction. 
Moreover, happiness is more directly related to our subjective 
state of response than it is to objective value. 
Laird does not make any one value supreme but places 
truth, beauty, and goodness (if we omit happiness) each in its 
own right. "These divisions of value, in short, do not only 
differ in kind, but legislate unconditionally within their 
kinds.n5 In other words, one value cannot be the judge of 
another. "To say that a truth is ugly or noxious .••• cannot 
affect the truth of it."6 By thus neglecting the facta of 
interpenetration among these ultimate values, he denies that 
5 Laird, SMT, 53. 
6 Laird, SMT, 54. 
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there is any single unity which comprehends them all. "The 
view that there is but one supreme end, a perfect union of all 
these divisions of excellence, cannot, I think, be sustained."? 
~his automatically rules out God.as the preserver of values, or 
even as possessing value, and thereby denies his existence. 
Laird is correct in denying God if there is no interpenetration 
or unity of these ultimate values, but other interpreters of 
experience do find grounds for believing in God, as we shall 
see later. 
There are various other treatments of truth, beauty, 
and goodness. Among them is Alexander' a theory which treats I' 
these three ultimate values as tertiary qualities. t"hThouegh 
1
1 
tertiary qualities are not the only kind of values, it 
is they which in the strictest sense have the right to the I 
name.•B Although truth, beauty, and goodness are all realities,! 
truth possesses a characteristic of inclusiveness. Thus he 
says, "Now truth we have seen is reality as possessed by mind, 
and hence in this sense the other values are parts of truth 
and truth is all-inclusive, because ita object is reality."9 
Although truth playa a very important role, Alexander rightly 
7 Laird, SMT, 59. 
8 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 302. 
9 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 300. 
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keeps it on the same plane with beauty and goodness. Reason's 
function is to interpret the whole of experience, but beauty 
I and goodness also have functions, which, although they inter-
penetrate, stand in their own right. The summum bonum for 
Alexander, then, follows the traditional threefold classifi-
cation. He makes two variations, however. The first is his 
doctrine of tertiary qualities. In this he emphasizes the 
union between mind and object, but he abstracts the relation. 
His second variation is his emphasis upon the character of 
these ultimate values as consisting of coherence. "We cannot 
regard value then as a quality of things •••• What we 
apprehend in objects of value is their coherence.nlO 
A word must be said concerning Alexander's view of 
deity and why it is not the summum bonum. In the first place, 
he makes deity to mean nothing more than what always lies 
beyond the present level. In the second place, "deity is not 
itself a value, for values are human inventions and deity is 
ultra-human.nll He then goes on to say, "God is for us the 
highest being in the universe, but he cannot be called the 
highest value, for there is no unvalue with which he can be 
contraated.nl2 God conserves values but is not himself one. 
,,. 
10 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 243. 
11 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 409. 
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Thus Alexander makes the three tertiary qualities - truth, 
beauty, and goodness - hie summum bonum. 
Another variation of the summum bonum in relation to 
truth, beauty, and goodness is made by G. E. Moore who makes 
goodness the supreme value in life. Hie ethical approach to 
I 
value dominates hie system and makes the goal of life goodness.! 
This summum bonum he speaks of as an "Universal Good". He 
says, "That a thing should be an ultimate rational end means, 
then, that it is truly good in itself; and that it is truly 
good in itself means that it is a part of Universal Good.nl3 
He states that the good is definable although good is not.l4 
However, just what the good is he does not clearly say 
although he gives us some suggestions as to what it may be. 
There are two things which Moore says the good is not. 
In the first place, it is not pleasurable feeling. He does not 
admit even the degree of pleasure that Laird does. Feelings, 
according to Moore, are inadequate as criteria for value, and 
to assert them as ultimate values is to fall into the natural-
istic fallacy. The good must be something objective. Secondly , 
the Universal Good is not deity. In speaking of Kant's use of 
13 Moore, PE, 100. 
14 Moore, PE, 9. 
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Practical Reason, he says, "· •• There ie no such being-
neither a GOd, nor any being such ae philosophers have called 
'' by the names I have mentioned. nl5 Thus the summum bonum must 
be something objective, yet not unitary like God. 
Now let ue see what affirmations Moore makes about the 
Universal Good. Firstly, about hie conception of universal. 
To put it briefly, he means by this that good ie good under 
every condition. If value ie true, then it ie true universal-
ly, for that is what intrinsic means. Secondly, the Universal 
Good is a whole. However,_ ultimate reality is not to be 
interpreted as a single whole, as we saw above, but rather as 
a series of wholes. Each value is a completed whole having 
parts. "What is asserted to have intrinsic value is the 
existence of the whole; and the existence of the whole includes , 
the existence of its part.n16 The third characteristic of the 
Universal Good is what Moore means by good. He is not very 
explicit on_ this point when he says: 
Indeed, so far as I can see, there is no characteristic 
whatever which always distinguishes every whole which 
has greater intrinsic value from every whole which has 
less, except the fundamental one that it would always 
be the duty of every agent to prefer the better to the 
worse, if he had to choose between a pair of actions, 
of which they would be the sole effects. And similarly, 
eo far as I can see, there is no characteristic what-
ever which belongs to all things that are intrinsically 
15 Moore, ETH, 151. 1 
I 
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16 Moore, PE, 29. IL 
!I 
11 
good and only to them - except simply the one that they 
all ~ intrinsically good and ought always to be pre-
ferred to nothing at all, if we had to choose between 
an action whose sole effect would be one of them and 
one which would have no effects whatever.l7 
As can be seen, this is not a very clear statement of what is 
meant by the highest good. · Certainly we ought to prefer the 
better to the worse, because that is what the term value 
means. And surely something is better than nothing. Even 
nature abhors a vacuum. Therefore, Moore has not given us 
' 
. ' 
much light on the problem of what he means by the summum bonum. 
His use of the universal we can understand, but when he defines 
the good, he goes off into hopeless abstraction and hie terms 
become merely a tautology. The obvious cause for this is the 
fact that he thinks no defintion of good is possible. In the 
second chapter we suggested that unless you are able to give 
some definition of good (value), you cannot know where you are 
going. Moore illustrates this perfectly. When he ·tries to 
arrive at a definition of the good, he finds that he cannot 
unless he also defines good. The result is that his theory 
becomes unrelated to life and abstract, and in so doing, he 
fails to assign proper respect to truth and beauty which also 
are ultimate values, and perhaps there may be others also,~ 
as we shall see when we diseuse later some other theories. 
(tt In conclusion, Moore makes goodness the summum bonum, but his 
17 Moore, ETH, 247-248. 
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definition of this highest good is a failure because of his 
refusal to define good. The good can never be defined without 
some reference to what we mean by good. 
A further variation of the Platonic classification of 
values is made by Bosanquet who.elevates truth(reason) to the 
position of the summum bonum above goodness and beauty. The 
embodiment of truth he finds in the Absolute: 
What we mean by it is in each case the same; we mean 
that which must stand; that which has nothing without 
to set against it, and which is pure self-maintenance 
within •••• In the ultimate sense ••• it is common 
ground that there can only be one indi vidual1;. and that, 
the individual, the Absolute.l8 
The character of this Absolute is strictly logical, as free 
from all inner contradiction: 
••• Positive pleasure and all satisfaction, as distinct 
from an intensity of feeling which there is reason to 
suspect of being illusory, depends on the character 
of logical stability of the whole inherent in the 
objects of desire, and that what in this sensa is more 
real, that is, more at one with itself and the whole 
(e. g. free from contradiction) is also the experience 
in which the mind obtains the more durable and coherent 
satisfaction, and more completely realizes itself. 
This consideration prescribes the nature of the ultimate 
good or end, which is the supreme standard of value, and 
cannot itself be measured by anything else.l9 
Thus, although Bosanquet says that value includes truth, 
beauty, and goodness, only the first characterizes the Absolute 
4t which is the summum bonum. The difficulty with this view is 
18 Bosanquet, PIV, 68. 
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the same as with Moore's. It overlooks the significance of 
other values. Perhaps truth deserves a higher place extrin-
sically because it interpenetrates more than other values, but 
the summum bonum is intrinsic and must therefore include 
beauty and goodness as well as truth. 
Mackenzie has given us a fourth variation of the 
Platonic trilogy when he makes beauty the highest good. He 
says: 
But is beauty thus understood, the only ultimate 
value? In a large sense of the term, I think this 
may fairly be maintained. Beauty i~ the only thing 
that is 'its own excuse for being.'ao 
Nothing is beautifulJthat is not in some way appre-
hended as real; and in this sense, truth is neces-
sarily included in beauty. Apart from this, truth 
can hardly be regarded as having value in itaelf.2l 
This emphasis upon beauty as the summum bonum is not as common 
as the theories above, although Croce and Gentile in Italy 
have had a wide influence, because beauty is moat often re-
garded aa being subjective. However, there are just as valid 
reasons for maintaining beauty is the supreme end as for truth 
or goodness. In fact, the principle of harmony which beauty 
embodies is almost the same thing aa the criterion of 
coherence. The ugly (disvalue) ia that which does not fit 
20 Mackenzie, UV, 141. 
21 Mackenzie, UV, 146. 
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harmoniously in with the other parts. Yet this theory too 
fails because it neglects the facta which indicate that truth 
and goodness are autonomous. 
We come now to a consideration of a theory propounded 
by Sorley which differs radically from the previous ones in 
having a distinctly religious touch. The summum bonum is 
found in God in whom all values are conserved: 
Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there 
also, as well as in moral goodness, we may see a mani-
festation of the divine. God must therefore be conceived 
as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth - as 
possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and 
goodnees and whatever else is of value for its own 
sake.az 
The affirmation of r~d Sorley finds by treating experience as 
a whole and not neglecting any of the facts. He places truth, 
beauty, and goodness on a par and then adds a fourth which is 
the crowning factor to his whole theory. This fourth value is 
what is commonly called religious value. The reason why much 
philosophy omits this value is that it treats religion too 
lightly. Sorley, however, perceives that there are values 
such as prayer, worship, and others which cannot be classified 
under any other head. They stand in their own right as valid 
parts of experience. Thus he says, "Only ideal objects, con-
~- ceived as independent oft ime, can be called permanent in the 
22 Sorley, MVG, 467. 
!. 
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strict sense. Such are the 'eternal values' of truth, beau~y, 
and goodneBBi such also is the love of God.n 23 It is through 
the inclusion of these religious values that Sorley makes a 
significant contribution to philosophy. It is evident that 
philosophy must now recognize them, and so religion receives 
a new support. It is important to note that only by an 
empirical, coherent view of experience such a theory is 
possible. Philosophy is thus driven to a consideration of 
the problem of God, for he is the summum bonum of all logical 
and consistent philosophy. 
23 Sorley, MVG, 43. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VALUE 
One of the most important problems in any theory of 
value is whether value is objective or subjective. Upon the 
answer to this depends our allegiance to many values. Take 
prayer for instance. Is there an objective reality to whom 
we pray? If there is not, then we have to ask ourselves why 
should we pray. In like manner many of our values depend upon 
an objective reference. Therefore, our first step must be to 
define the difference between subjective and objective value. 
All theories of value fall under one of these two heads, 
although there are common factors in both. When we speak of 
subjective value, we mean that value is the product of a human 
attitude or judgment, and by objective value we mean that it 
is independent of human attitudes or judgments.l This is the 
problem which we saw first when we discussed the definability 
of value. 
There are both mentalistic and extra-mental theories of 
value, the latter being objective by definition. The mental-
istic theories are classified as either subjective or objec-
1 Brogan, Art. 1, 127 • 
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tive. Under each of these heads there are two types, personal 
and impersonal.2 We shall deal at length with only three of 
these types. G. E. Moore and Laird are realists who represent 
the extra-mental group. Alexande~ is the most eminent 
representative of the impersonal subjective type. Schiller, 
a distinguished humanist, makes value personal and subjective. 
However, we shall let Alexander represent the subjective type 
because he treats value more completely. Examples of the other 
types are Bosanquet whose logical system represents the 
impersonal objective thought and Sorley who makes value 
objective and personal. 
First let us take the subjective position represented 
by Alexander. It must be said that Alexander claims at times 
that his theory of value is objective, but taken as a whole 
we shall see that it is really subjective. He sets up a 
double criterion of value, one which is individual and one 
which is social. In the individual criterion he introduces 
his theory of tertiary qualities. These qualities are the 
product of a subject-object determination. "Values then are 
unlike the empirical qualities of external things, shape, or 
fragrance, or life; they imply the amalgamation of the object 
2 See Brightman's article on this subject in Wilm, Studies in 
Philosophy and Theology. 
I 
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with the human appreciation of it."3 Value under this theory 
depends upon both a mind and an object. It is something which 
such a combination creates. If we adhere strictly to our 
definition, Alexander must be classed as subjective because 
value for him cannot exist apart from the human attitude, even 
though it also depends on an objective reference. 
However, Alexander is clearly subjective when he comes 
to hie second criterion of value - the social mind. In fact, 
if it were not for society, we would not be aware of values at 
all, because it is only through conflicts in society that our 
values are formed. He says: 
It is social intercourse, therefore, which makes us 
aware that there is a reality compounded of ourselves 
and the object, and that in that relation the object 
has a character which it would not have except for 
that relation. 4 
By collective mind he does not mean that society really has a 
mind, nor "a new mind, which is the mind of a group.n5 What 
he does mean by the social mind is a standard mind. Society 
seta up standards and these constitute the collective mind. 
The intercourse among minds results in conflicts, and these 
conflicts produce standards which we call values. Nor does 
3 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 238. 
4 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 240. 
5 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 241. 
------ --- ----
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Alexander confine value to buman beings. "Value does not 
begin at the human level, but exists in ita appropriate form 
at an earlier level."6 The process by which evolution 
produces values he calls adaptation. "Value depends upon 
adaptation and adaptation assumes the character of value 
through the rejection of the unadapted values.n7 Values thus 
become a social enterprise and possess no other objectivity. 
The emphasis upon the individual, even in society, labels 
Alexander's theory as subjective. 
The fundamental weakness of this theory is ita doctrine 
of tertiary qualities. Alexander still insists on the die-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities, as well as 
hie tertiary qualities, which Berkeley completely overthrew. 
Any such distinction results in vagueness and abstractness, 
which is true in Alexander's case. It is much easier to 
argue for tertiary qualities than to describe what they are 
other than being subject-object determinations. They are not 
concrete experiences but rather the product of theory. There-
fore, Alexander's subjective view is not based on empirical 
proof, and coherent experience is the only measuring stick 
which we have. 
6 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 273. 
7 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 312. 
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A. further objection to his subjective view is that any 
subjective theory always rests upon an assumption of an objec-
tive validity. Subjectivists insist that there are values to 
be gained as products of our own personality rather than from 
any objective reality. However, J. s. Mill, himself a 
hedonist, claimed that if we seek these subjective states, we 
never attain them. Thus to pursue happiness is neverrto .. be 
happy. Even to say that we should believe in objective forces 
although they do not exist is begging the question. Subjec-
tivity cannot produce the desired results so always assumes 
objectivity. 
Furthermore, the subjective theory of value fails to 
I account for the presence of permanence or standards in values. 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Thus when I judge a thing beautiful, I do not mean simply that 
!.think it is beautiful but that the object possesses a 
standard of beauty. If this were not the case, our only 
criterion could be a majority vote, and that is not what we 
mean by truth, beauty, and goodness. In fact, we often say 
that the majority is wrong. We also choose among our desires, 
which are values in their simplest form. We even say that 
some of our desires may be wrong, or some desires are better 1 
:• than others. The standard for any such judgment must be an 1 
objective reality independent of our desire. mhus any subjec- J 
tive theory of value fails to explain the whole of experience. 
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Now let us examine the objective theories of value. The 
philosophers who comprise this class may be subdivided into 
three groupe: realists, absolutists, and personalists. All 
three groupe agree in making values independent of human 
feeling or interest, but as to the exact place of objective 
reference they disagree. In the location of this value, they 
roughly follow the general outlines of realism, absolute 
idealism, and personalistic idealism. The realiete'make value 
extra-mental and deny the relation to any mind, whereas the 
absolutists insist on the mental relation. The personalists 
are still a third variation. They are a middle position 
between the extremes of realism and absolute idealism. They 
hold that the interpretation of value must be in terms of mind, 
but they do not deny the reality of finite minds in order to 
affirm an absolute Mind, as Boeanquet does. For them the 
universe is a society of selves, and so values reside in 
individuals (Sorley). 
Examining the claims of the realists to an objective 
theory of value, we shall begin with G. E. Moore. H. W. Wright 
in an article on the objectivity of value comments on the 
fact that Moore establishes his objectivity without reference 
,. to metaphysics. 8 In this respect, Moore means that hie 
8 Wright, Art. 1. 
objectivity does not depend on any abstract metaphysics: 
I define 'metaphysical', therefore, by a reference 
to superaenaible reality; although I think that the 
only non-natural objects, about which it has succeeded 
in obtaining truth, are objects which do not exist 
at all. 9 
Moore's view is baaed rather on common sense. Since he places 
secondary qualities in the same category with primary ones, he 
goes one step further and places value qualities on the same 
footing. Thus the idea of worth, of color, and of extension 
I are all objectively real. His is the nalve view but the 
I philosophy in back of it is not as simple as it first sounds. 
I 
I 
I 
It appears quite evident to the average mind, but philosophy 
was a 16ng time in discovering that even secondary and primary 
qualities must all be treated alike. Now Moore says that 
tertiary qualities (values) are the same as primary and 
secondary qualities. Moore is correct in equating all three, 
and this is the basic philosophy behind his common sense view 
of value. 
Thilly in his History of Philosophy says that Moore's 
i theory is subjective because Moore does not assign values to 
I 
'I reality .10 
1 
reality is not the same as the relation between value and 
However, the question of the relation of value to 
I 
~-9---M-o_o_r_e_, __ P_E_,--112. 
10 Thilly, HOP, 581. 
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objectivity, although they are often associated with each 
other. It is possible for value to be subjective and still be 
a part of ultimate reality. What Moore means here is that 
value is a quality which individual minds recognize and which 
they do not create, it being extra-mental. As he says, "When 
we call a thing 'good' we never mean simply that somebody has 
some mental attitude towards it.nll Moore supports this 
statement by showing that we can desire a thing and still 
not know whether it is good or bad. ·In other words, we choose 
among our desires. According to our definition of subjective 
and objective, if a thing exists apart from our minds, then it 
is objective. Moore says: 
Whenever he thinks of 'intrinsic value', or 'intrinsic 
worth 1 , or eaye that a thing 'ought to exist', he has 
before hie mind the unique object - the unique property 
of things- which I mean by 1 good•.l2 
We now must ask how this value enters our minds eo as to be 
known. Avoiding any epistemological argument, we shall simply 
say that Moore relies upon intuition to do this. Value is 
objective and independent as a set of ultimate essences to be 
known by intuition.l3 However, intuition is not an adequate 
criterion for either truth or value. The only logical 
criterion ie that of coherence. 
'~ 11 Moore, ETH, 161. 
12 Moore, PE, 17. 
13 Brogan, Art. 1, 128. 
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Laird, also realistic in hie theory, likewise says that 
value is objective in the sense that it does not depend on 
human minds: 
There is beauty, in sky and cloud and sea, in lilies 
and in sunsets, in the glow of the bracken in autumn 
and in the enticing greeness of a leafy spring. Nature, 
indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear 
her beauty as she weare colour or sound. Why then 
should her beauty belong to us rather than to her? 
Human character and human dispositions have value or 
worth, which belongs to them in the same sense as 
redness belongs to the cherry.l4 
1 Here we see that Laird goes eo far in hie objectivity as to 
base it on nature itself, which he believes contains value. 
Thus hie is a type of objective naturalism. 
I I The obstacle which these realists fail to surmount is 
I 
that of linking value up with life. If the objectivity of 
value lies in the fact that it is extra-mental, then there 
I 
1 remains no way by which value can enter our experience, because 
I all our experience is mediated by our consciousness and know-
ledge. Moore relies upon intuition but this is not a solution. 
Neither can a realistic theory describe what value is. It is 
1 easy to postulate the objective value, but if that value lies 
beyond all reason, then it is a eomething-I-know-not-what. 
Moore thinks it is impossible even·. to define value partly 
~~- because the method of analysis does not lead to definitions, 
65 
• 
rc=====-====-::-:=-:======-==-=------~ --- ----= __ --:c=:::-=-..;-::=-:-=.=--=--====~----~ -""~ 
I 
~~~~~~-~~~~~··~·····~--~-·~~~~~~-~--~-~--~····~-~ ...=.~--~-.. ~--~· ~~~~~~--~~·~ 
~--~~~·-·--· ·--·-·- ---·--·- ··---·--·-
66 
1 
I 
~ ·-·-··--··----·~-··--··--- .. ::.::.=-.=···=· == 
·:-c···-:·:·::··c-:.c:·.:c·.-:c:· 
1
.-.:-.. _- - ..... - ...... -·· -. ·-  ·· ._ -==.'-"=.-:.=-=:.= -·----~ ___ .. ~c:::c,::.-::.·..:-_:-
I but also because value ia something beyond our knowing process. 
I 
I !However, such a theory does not satisfy us because we want to 
·know both what value is and what its metaphysical statue is. 
I 
I 
I 
The difference between the objective realists and the 
absolute idealists in addition to the mental relationship lies 
in the fact that the realists think there is no unity among 
values, while the absolute idealists interpret value in relation 
1 to the whole. Thus Laird, a realist, says, "The view that there 
is but one supreme end, a perfect union of all these divi"sione 
of excellence, cannot, I think, be sustained.nl5 Opposing this 
view, Boeanquet, an absolute idealist, says, "· •• Logic, or 
the spirit of totality, is the clue to reality, value, and 
1 freedom.nl6 The distinction between these two views is 
important. The realists tend to rely on the method of analysis, 
since reality is a society of individuals, while the idealists 
employ the method of synthesis as their test. This is true only 
of objective realists, as we shall see. Alexander is a 
naturalistic realist who holds a subjective theory of value, 
and he appeals to the criterion of coherence, which is synthesis 
'taken in its final form, and does not make much use of the 
method of analysis. 
15 Laird, SMT, 59. 
~16 Bosanquet, PIV, 23. 
1 
I 
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•• 
. The criterion of coherence, as we saw when we were 
discussing the definability of value, is the only adequate and 
logical criterion we have, whether it be for truth or value. 
The realists for the moat part affirm analysis as over against 
synthesis, and the absolute idealists use only synthesis. 
I 
I When we stack each of these two methods up against the ideal 
II 
I 
of coherence, we find that each falls short. Therefore, they 
must be used as complementary rather than self-sufficient 
methode. Thus absolute idealism is not the whole story any 
more than is realism. This rnuet be kept in mind along with the 
above suggestion that moat subjective theories of value appeal 
to coherence for their validity. If objectiviam is the only 
67 
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logical poei ti.on, how does it happen that .the:: subjectivi-st 
employe the correct method? It certainly indicates that 
objective value in ita extreme forme overlooks something, and 
this obscure something is what this chapter will try to 
discover. 
Boeanquet, however, illustrates how ultimately we must 
accept value in relation to the whole. He pointe out that 
everything we are or know is in one way or another related to 
something else and dependent on it. Therefore, according to 
·~~· his definition of individuality as being that which is entirely 
1 self-sufficient, only the Absolute can be a true individual: 
.... :'·-. 
I' jl 
I 
I 
I 
~I 
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What we mean by it (individuality) is in each case the 
same; we mean that which must stand; that which has 
nothing without to set against it, and which is pure 
self~maintenance within •.•• In the ultimate 
sense .•• it is common ground that there can only 
be one individual, and that, the individual, the 
Abeolute.l7 
li It is thus that Bosanquet achieves hie Absolute. 
I! 
There are two 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
i 
I 
objections to his view. In the first place, the Absolute is 
alien to life and experience. Bosanquet denies this,l8 but ,, 
nevertheless, he roots hie philosophy in logic rather than in ll 
experience as a whole. He moulds and selects the facts to fit I I 
his theory. The second objection is to his denial of reality 
to finite minds. If value is for the Absolute alone, why 
should we even try to reason about life? The finite individual 
is our only clue to reality. It is at this point that the 
personalistic idealists break with Boeanquet. They recognize 
that the starting place for every theory is with the individual. 
Every experience is ~ experience. 
So far we have been talking about Boeanquet's general 
theory rather than about his specific treatment of value. 
Concerning this latter point, he says that hie theory of value 
is objective, while recognizing at the same time that there 
"Every purpose, no doubt, implies a 
68 
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subjective value, but there is no reason why every true value 
' should be a purpose. nl9 Boeanquet percei vee that although there. 
(It is a degree of subjectivity in every value-judgment, neverthe-
~-
Ji less there is also a recognition of something beyond ourselves: 
!I 
II 
li 
Finite consciousness, whether animal or human, did not 
make its body, and does not set the greater purposes to 
its world. Something greater and more inclusive than 
itself both operates through it and reveals itself to 
it.20 
j i This objective reference becomes dominant in Bosanquet's theory 
I 
I 
I! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
'I 
I 
! 
to the exclusion of the subjective. ~hue it is that he can 
affirm reality only of the Absolute and deny the reality of 
finite minds and values. Furthermore, value is only a deriva-
tive of reality. He says: 
Therefore we adhere to Plato's conclusion that objects 
of our likings possess as much of satisfactoriness -. 
which we identify with value - as they possess of 
reality and trueness. And that is a logical standard, 
and a standard involving the whole.21 
Hence value is dependent on logic. We now have to ask ourselve 
whether or not this is a true interpretation of experience. I 
1 think that we shall have to agree that it is not. Life is 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'I I, 
I' II 
I 
larger than logic in a certain sense. Logic attempts to relate 
every experience to ourselves, but the experience itself does 
not depend on logic. Experience is the content upon which 
19 Bosanquet, PIV, 127. 
20 Bosanquet, PIV, 221. 
21 Bosanquet, PIV, 317. 
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il 
1/ logic works. This applies also to values. We apeak of true 
' i values not in the sense that they depemd on truth for their 
I 
II 
I' II 
II 
II 
II 
I! 
I 
I 
I 
existence, but that their truth is measured by their coherence 
with life as a whole, and logic furnishes us with that 
criterion. Bosanquet is unjustified in limiting experience to 
"rational experience." His naturalistic theory of value is too 
one-aided, although at times he tries to give it an emotional 
touvh. 
We saw above that a subjective theory is unable to 
account for the objective standards which we recognize. An 
impersonal objective theory of value has the opposite weakness. 
Boaanquet is able to explain why his system hangs together, but 
he cannot adequately explain why individuals deviate from tne 
coherent whole. He attempts to meet the difficulty by not 
assigning reality to finite individuals, but the only thing we 
ever know immediately is ourself and our own experiences. 
Therefore, an impersonal and objective theory of value negates 
a valid part of experience. 
We now turn our attention to a representative of the 
personalistic school, w. R. Sorley, who in hie Moral Valuea:1 and 
" ~~ the Idea of God has given one of the clearest and moat compre-
He differs from Boaanquet in two 
Firat he refuses to deny reality to finite minds 
70 
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as Bosanquet does. Rather, he makes his whole theory of value 
knowledge. We might summarize the difference between Sorley 
I 
' and Boeanquet by the distinction between two terms - God and 
the Absolute. Sorley conceives of ultimate reality in terms of 
a personal God, with all the religious flavor which accompanies 
such a belief. On the other hand, Bosanquet believes in the 
I abstract conception of an Absolute which is devoid of all 
II 
I 
I 
emotion and feeling: 
••. The selective conations of finite minds cannot 
••• claim a fundamental position as the source of 
order and value. And this applies to the mind of a 
finite god, if such a being is to be treated as 
conceivable.22 
I Whereas Bosanquet refines his philosophy until he has sifted 
1 out the personal and emotional elements, Sorley makes his 
I 
11 philosophy an interpretation of the whole of experience, in-
1 oluding values. 
I! We shall examine Sorley'a treatment of experience first 
jl because it furnishes the data of his theory. He attacks first 
d 
' of all those interpretations of experience which leave out the 
~~. value side. In speaking of metaphysical ethics, of which 
. If 
22 Boeanquet, PIV, 127 • 
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Bosanquet is an example, he says: 
=-+-·-------' 
I 
I 
; 
'I 
The fault which is to be found with metaphysical 
ethics is, in the end, just this, that its data are 
insufficient. It tends to disregard that portion 
of experience which is of greatest importance for 
its purpose, namely, moral experience.23 
1: 
1 We have notions of good and bad, and these notions are just as 
i 
I 
I 
much a part of our actualJ conscious experience as our sense-
experience. All cognition is based on a hypothesis that our 
sense-experiences are rational, eo it is not absurd to say 
that value-experience is also valid. If we are not allowed to 
have knowledge of value, then we have no knowledge of anything. 
Values and sense-experiences stand or fall together as far as 
1 their validity is concerned. Sorley 1 s point is that our 
I 
I 
I 
tl 
I 
I 
personality is of two parte: emotions and reason. One part is 
as valid as the other when it has been tested by the ideal of 
coherence. However, we must be careful not to draw too sharp 
a distinction between these two because they interpenetrate. 
They are distinguishable but not separable. 
Having established values as a valid part of the data 
of experience, Sorley then proceeds to show the relation 
between value and human personality. He makes personality 
serve two purposes for hie theory. First of all it illustrates 
~~ ii how a philosophy of value differs from natural science. 
J· 
Scienc 
II !I 23 Sorley, MVG, 20. 
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ia concerned with the universal in things, while value exists 
only in particular individuals and the field of the sciences 
(lit is not that of value. "Value lies outside their scope because 
they are concerned with the universal and not with the individ-
ual, and the latter is the home of value.n24 Thus science and 
value theory deal with different aspects of reality. 
The second use made of the appeal to personality is to 
!establish the objectivity of value. This Sorley does by ahow-
l
ling that if persona are objective, value, which is a valid 
,part of personal experience, must also be objective. He 
I 
1 logically overthrows the subjective view of value by showing 
•that any subjective theory begs the question by assuming an 
objective world-view. In this respect, values are even more 
significant for personality than cognition, because cognition 
is a means for reachi~g these values. "The attitude of 
valuation, accordingly, may even be said to have priority in 
the development of mind over the attitude of cognition.n25 
But apart from the relation between value and cognition, there 
is a further reason for the objectivity of value. In Sorley 1 s 
philosophy, the only existent ia the concrete individual, and 
since value is meaningless apart from existence, he makes 
24 Sorley, MVG, 111. 
25 Sorley, MVG, 25. 
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Jj value eternal only as persons are eternal. Reality is composed 
i 
i of relations, persona, and values. Just as relatione apply to 
I things, eo values apply to persona. Things are neither good 
I 
It nor bad in themselves and so do not poaaeea value. "Ethical 
1\ principles are valid for persons; physical principles are valid 
II for material things; and this difference is the ground of the 
different kinde of validity possessed by each.n86 Both the 
il logical and the empirical goal of hie theory of value Sorley 
finds in God. The fact that value a are conserved in the world 
and are objective pointe to someone beyond ourselves whom we 
call God. Thus he says: 
Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there 
also, as well as in moral goodness, we may see a 
manifestation of the divine. God must therefore be 
conceived as the final home of values, the Supreme 
Worth - as possessing the fulneea of knowledge and 
beauty and goodneea and whatsoever else is of value 
for ita own aake.~7 
So Sorley climaxes his system with God, as contrasted with 
Boeanquet'a Absolute. 
Yet this distinction between Boaanquet and Sorley 
depends entirely upon what interpretation of experience we 
take. There are facts'which point to the unreality of the 
human personality, and Sorley usee them to point us beyond to 
l'l lA \. II 
11 II 26 II Sorley, lNG, 190. 
I, 27 Sorley, MVG, 467. 
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God. However, when these isolated factors are placed in the 
! I whole, they are rather insignificant. We must justify our 
I I preference for Sorley 1 s theory on the basis of his treatment 
! 
I of experience. We have already indicated above how Boeanquet 
! 
i selected his evidence on the basis of its rational content. 
i 
I Sorley usee a different method and appeals to the ideal 
criterion of coherence, which we have already assumed to be the 
only possible one. Ignoring extrinsic value and using only 
intrinsic value as true value, Sorley says, "If we are to 
compare values at all, it appears to me that we must give up 
the idea of a scale for that of a system.n28 This coherence is 
not always easy to apply, but it is the only criterion we have. 
"Freedom from contradiction, coherence, and thus possible 
systematisation are criteria by which the validity of any 
moral judgment may be tested.n29 On this basis, then, we must 
prefer Sorley 1 s interpretation of experien~e because he has 
included more facta than Bosanquet. 
There are two criticisms of Sorley 1 s theory which do not 
destroy but enlarge upon it. The first is that he draws a too 
ehaDp distinction between things and values. There are not a 
world of science and a world of values but rather there is one 
28 s orley, MVG, 51. 
29 Sorley, MVG, 97. 
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J world which contains both things and values which are mutually 
l1 related. Many of our values depend upon things for their 
j realization, indicating that things and values interpenetrate. 
I Nevertheless, Sorley is correct in affirming the fact that 
values do not receive their worth from objects. 
A second criticism is that Sorley overlooks the subjec- I 
tive reference in every value-judgment. Metaphysically, values 1 
are objective, but they would be ~eaningless unless they were I 
related to our own consciousness. All values as we experience 
them contain a subjective factor, some more ao than others. 
We desire something and ~ desires are satisfied. It is the 
satisfaction which is objective, but it cannot be divorced from 
the desire. As Mackenzie aaya, "· •• The subjective and 
objective aspects of value are inseparably bound together.n30 
This point even personalistic value is apt to overlook. Our 
coherent theory of value, therefore, must recognize that value 
is objective in its validity, but ita satisfaction is subjec-
tive. 
We must note in passing that Sorley brings religion 
back within the realm of philosophy. Many thinkers would 
{~ rule out the problem of God, but Sorley has carefully weighed 
30 Mackenzie, UV, 141. 
I 
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the evidence and found that there are religious values just as 
there are truth values and beauty values and moral values. It 
is true that he does not treat these religious values at length, 
but that would not be within his purpose. The distinctly 
religious philosophy at the end of hie theory clearly indicates, 
however, that he considers religious values as empirical facts 
of experience. He is therefore unswayed by the popular 
prejudice against including God even in philosophy. 
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I CHAPTER VII ) VALUE AND EVIL 
No coherent theory of value can be constructed by con~ 
I 
I 
II 
lj' 
sidering only the fact of value in the universe. The whole ·of I 
I I 
\ experience furnishes us with more than that and shows that 1 
~\ there is ·disvalue, or evil, in the world. The problem then 
arises as to how these facts should be treated. Is it possible 
to believe in value and disvalue at the same time? This \ 
i 
problem is especially important for a theory of objective 
) value which, as we saw in the preceding chapter, is the most 
/j· coherent system. Thus Mackenzie says: 
li . . . The importance of a right under standing of the 
11 conception of Value, with the view of seeing whether 
the main difficulty in the way of an idealistic 
system can be removed. It is evident that that 
difficulty lies in what is known as the problem of 
evil.l . 
!J 
I 
I 
I 
! 
II 
II 
I! 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Even apart from any theory of value, it is important that we 
explain the.presence of evil. There are two ways of doing 
this. The first is to explain evil by reducing it to moral 
good. Thus value becomes a term which includes both good 
and evil. However, the facts of experience do not warrant 
this-procedure. There are evils in the world - floods, fires, 
earthquakes, disease, etc. - which do not admit of this 
1 Mackenzie, UV, 86. 
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I treatment. The second method of meeting this problem preserves 
the reality of evil while at the same time explaining it. To 
explain does not mean that evil has to be explained away. No 
effort is made to dilute the facts, but they are faced squarely 
as they present themselves. The presence of evil is no slight 
obstacle to value, and it is necessary to assign adequate 
importance to all the facta. 
Yet there is much that can be said for a theory which 
can reduce evil to goodness. By such a method an almost 
logically water-tight theory may be obtained. A theory which 
does not have to account for evil is spared much embarrassment 
and diffioul ty. Bosanquet 'a is such a theory. He argues that 
the fact of evil is simply a fact which does not make it an 
absolute metaphysical reality: 
It is a mistake to treat the.finite world, or pain, or 
evil, as an illusion. To the question whether they are 
real or are not real, the answer must be, as to all 
questions of this type, that everything is real, eo 
long as you do not take it for more than it ia. On 
~he view here accepted, finiteness, pain, and evil 
are essential features of Reality, and belong to an 
aspect of it which leaves ita marks even on perfec-
tion.2 
Taking this statement as the basis for his conception of evil, 
let us examine more closely just what he means. He says that 
\~ evil must be regarded as real, but reality he usee in a 
2 Bosanquet, PIV,.240-241 .. 
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11 qualified sense. When he says that 1 t must not be taken for 
II more than it is, he indicates that it is not truly real- i.e., 
I 
1 the Absolute could not be evil. But first let us see just 
what he means by evil. 
In the first place, evil possesses a character which is 
partly the same as good in the sense that neither can stand 
j alone. 
I Again, both good and evil, like truth and error, 
are made of the same stuff •••• Neither has or 
could have its character without the other; and if 
you could wipe out t~e one you would annihilate the 
other along with it. 
II 
Good, then, is no more real than evil because, according to 
I Bosanquet'a reasoning, the Absolute must be devoid of all imner 
I 
I contradiction. The Absolute is beyond good and evil. It is I! 
I' I 
J true that for us good and evil are relative terms, but so are 
black and white. Of course Bosanquet wouid reply that black 
or white can not be applied to the Absolute either, yet we 
I mean an actual color when we speak of an object possessing it. 
I 
li il 
II 
II 
Nor is it any more possible to speak of good and evil as 
possessing the same character. Moral good and evil are alike 
only in having a common content. Both depend upon what we 
do with a certain thing, and the thing is neither good nor 
(tt bad in itself, but becomes good or bad only when our actions 
. 
II 3 
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make it such. But even this answer only shoves the·problem 
one stage deeper. our actions, then, possess a character of 
either goodness or badness, and that character is not the same 
in both instances. If we judge our actions by the criterion 
of coherence, a single action cannot be both good and bad at 
the same time. Moreover, the facts of natural evil do not in 
any sense allow of an interpretation in terms of ultimate 
good. There is no quality of goodness in a diaaaterous fire, 
i 
1
1 although persona may achieve good results by transcending that 
particular event. For example, a fire in an unsafe tenement 
I 
II 
li 
I 
house might call attention of other aimiliar buildings to the 
notice of city officials who would "clean them up." However, 
ity of good and evil the explanation of their characters. 
However, Boaanquet further reduces the reality from li 
il evil by making it an inner contradiction. Since he makes all 
II 
II 
ji 
,I 
II 
i 
I 
II 
reality dependent upon the absence of inner contradiction and 
relatione, and evil ia self-contradictory while good is not, 
good ia more real than evil. It is true that both have the 
same composition, but the addition of inner contradiction to 
evil makes it leas real. If Boaanquet had used the criterion 
of coherence rather than that of self-limitation, hie results 
... 
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I would be quite different. As it ie, logical non-contradiction 
I does not treat evil in the concrete and this is a serious 
i! weaknese. This weakness leads into great difficulty when it 
I comes to a consideration of evil and the Absolute. Since the 
I 
I Absolute is the only logical reality and also all-inclusive, 
: 
I the problem arises as to what should be done with evil. The 
I . 
1 Absolute cannot logically contain any evil, yet evil is a fact 
I in our experience. Bosanquet solves the puzzle by relying on 
,, logical abstractness: 
,, 
1: 
j; 
I 
There is evil, then, within the Absolute, but the 
Absolute is not characterized by evil •••• It is 
true, good as good involves evil, but good as 
absorbed in ~erfection only involves evil as absorbed 
! within good. 
1 It is only by denying the reality of evil that he avoids a 
logical contradiction, because the Absolute could not be both 
I perfect and imperfect. Therefore, the distinction between 
I 
1 good and evil is destroyed and evil is absorbed within the 
II 
1! good. 
i 
I 
j The result of this method is to overlook the concrete 
j facts of evil in the universe. Bosanquet's system is secure 
I logically, but evil must be considered in actual experience 
1
1 
and not in the abstract. It is a fact which· must be dealt 
with fairly. It is true, as he says, "We feel, as we con-
I! stantly admit, that our judgment of morality and of failure is 
r--
4 Bosanquet, VDI, 217. 
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I . 
:;not all there is to be said about a man. His value and his 
11 reality lie deeper than that. •5 But even though evil may not 
lbe supreme, it is still a fact. Furthermore, the overcoming 
I I' and transcendence of evil takes place in co!lcrete experience 
il and not in a logical dialectic. Bosanquet 's dialectic needs 
Ito be filled with the stuff of experience which would make 
evil real. He feels, however, that if we only knew more, evil 
I :would in some way turn out to be good. Two creplies;~should".:.;be 
!made to this. Firstly, we do not know more. If we are to do 
II 
11 any thinking at all, it must be done on this assumption. It 
'I . j1 is our task to work with what we have and not long for greater 
!powers. Secondly, there are actual evils which are logical 
I 
!contradictions, and even though we knew infinitely more, they 
I 
iwould still appear as such. If the laws of reality are rational 
.1 laws, then what is irrational now must be irrational for all 
II time and place. It is not true that •the critic who insists 
I/ on the brute facta of suff~ring condemns himself and others to 
I it."6 Unless we are conacious of the facts of evil, even 
,!though they may appear brutal to us, we cannot transcend them. 
I!Bosanquet, therefore, unempirically denies reality to evil. 
II j;He makes all evil unreal because it involves logical contra-
/\diction, but he overlooks logical evil. 
11--
1: 5 II Bosanquet, PIV, 17. 
!16 1 Bosanquet, VDI, 219. 
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Thus it is necessary to affirm the reality of evil. 
W. R. Sorley says, "The facts of morality as they appear in the 
I world, and the idea of good and evil found in man's conscious-
~ ness, are among the data of experience.•? He takes the whole 
of experience and finds that it includes evil as well as good. 
Therefore, a theory of value must take into account the presence 
Likewise, Alexander says, "Thus 
1 
of disvalue in the world. 
truth and error, goodness and badness, beauty and ugliness, are 
1 __ .,. 
I 
I 
I 
J all realities among the sum total of reality."S Whereas J 
Bosanquet solves the problem by logically denying evil's realit I' 
those who affirm .the reality of evil like Sorley and Alexander 
- . . . ~- .... 
accept the fact of evil and then construct their theories. We 
saw above that Bosanquet makes evil fit hie theory, but such i 
,j 
men as Sorley, Mackenzie, Alexander, and· Laird try to make thei 'I 
theories fit the facts, the sharpest contrast being betwee·n 
Bosanquet and Alexander. Sorley and Mackenzie incorporate part 
from both extreme. Now let us see just how these respective 
1: theories recognize diavalue in the universe. 
,! 
I 
I The first point upon which they agree is that the nature 
!J of evil is that of incoherence. Bosanquet, in denying the 
I 
reality of evil, appealed to the principle of inner coherence, 
7 Sorley, MVG, 1. 
I 8 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 300. 
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but Alexander appeals to external coherence. We aretJUnable ::to 
I distinguish good and evil unless we take them in their complete 
['. 85 
! I II setting. "Error we saw was a real:!, ty, but it was not true. 
11 
II [Badness is more plainly a reality, just as much as goodnessj 
I 
I but it is not good, and it is incoherent with what is good."9 
I It is this incoherence which seta evil off from good, because I ' 
in other respects "the materials of virtue and vice are ident~ 
iical.nlO The difference between Alexander and Bosanquet, then, 
I 
I 
j is the manner in which they conceive the essential character-
! istic of evil and not in some substance which might be a sub-
1 stratum for evil. Alexander's appeal to the criterion of 
I coherence is superior because it treats with the whole of 
I 
1
1 
reality. 
1 
that it involved an inner contradiction and therefore could 
Bosanquet turned evil in upon itself and discovered 
I not be real·; but Alexander fits evil into experience as a 
whole. There are two ways by which evil may be interpreted. 
It may be taken in the narrow sense as the opposite of moral 
\1 goodness, or it may be taken as disvalue which is the opposite 
,! 
II 
I 
i 
of value. Whichever sense we may choose, the same criterion 
applies. Just as coherence is the ~riterion of truth and 
I distinguishes the false from the true, so it tells us what is 
evil. Moralists have longed for a single, absolute method of 
\~ telling the bad from the good by which we can take a single 
Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 280. 
10 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 281. 
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action and tell whether it is good or bad, but such we do not 
have anymore than we can take a fact alone and tell whether it 
is true or false. Bosanquet tried to achieve the impossible 
and define evil in isolation, but his only answer was that 
evil was not real. Alexander keeps evil as a real experience 
by using coherence as his criterion. This is the essential 
contrast between the theories which make evil unreal and those 
who insist upon its reality. 
This latter group also agrees that good and evil stand 
in a relative position to each other as far as our knowledge 
of them is concerned. We are unable to think of goodness with-
out thinking of its opposite, evil. This fact Alexander 
recognizes when he says: . 
The so-called tertiary 'qualities' of things, truth, 
goodness, and beauty, are values (and for us are the 
most important of the values), and imply and are un-
intelligible without a contrast with their unvalues 
of error, evil, and ugliness.ll 
Bosanquet used this fact to show that the Absolute transcends 
all good and evil. His view, however, is not in keeping with 
experience. It is much more valuable simply;: tp recognize that 
good and evil must be relative for us. The world as we know it 
is the best that we can conceive, and is as Mackenzie says: 
A world in which there was no aspect of evil at all 
would in truth be a world 'Beyond Good and Evil'; 
11 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 236-237. 
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and such a world would, at any rate, not be a good 
world. It seems clear, therefore, that the world 
that is selected by rational choice is a world 
that contains some aspect of evil.12 
These philosophers who affirm the reality of evil deal with ita 
relativity in concrete instances, while Boaanquet treats ita 
relativity in the abstract. It is as Laird says, that we could 
have no ethics without a knowledge of good and evil.l3 
Alexander brings evolution to bear upon this problem by point-
ing out that "the establishment of value and the extirpation 
of unvalue is the sign of adaptation."l4 It is only when the 
social mind makes a mistake that value is achieved. Thus 
development depends upon evil. 
However realistic these theories of evil may sound, 
they must be measured in terms of the relation of evil to the 
highest value. For our present purposes let us apeak of this 
highest value as God. If evil is truly real, then God must 
somehow encompass it; i.e., if he is to be active in our lives. 
We here find disagreement among those who affirm the reality of 
evil as to the status of evil in God. On one side, Alexander 
denies that God can be a value at all. "God is for us the 
highest being in the universe, but he cannot be called the 
12 Mackenzie, Art. 2, 267. 
13 Laird, SMT, 93. I I 
14 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 417. I 
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highest value, for~here is no unvalue with which he can be 
contraeted.nl5 Strange as it may seem, this is the very 
argument which Boeanquet usee to establish his Absolute. Nor 
can it be denied that Bosanquet has drawn the only logical 
conclusion. The reality of evil for Alexander, then, is no 
more metaphysical than it ia for Boaanquet, but deity for 
Alexander ia not metaphysical either. 
It is possible, however, to make evil metaphysically 
real, and a part of God• in the sense that he is limited. 
. 
Whether this limitation ia a self-limitation or is compelled 
by God's very nature as in the conception of the Finite God 
it is not our purpose to inquire. The fact of limitation is 
the essential thing. Sorley is an excellent example of this 
method of treating evil. He recognizee the need for making 
God vital and also·the responsibility of doing justice to the 
facta of evil, so he makes evil the result of God's self-
limitation: 
If ethical theism is to stand, the evil in the 
world cannot be referred to God in the same way as 
the good ia referred to him; and the only way to 
avoid this reference is by the postulate of human 
freedom. This freedom must be a real freedom, eo 
that it may account for the actual choice of evil 
when good might have been chosen. We have there-
fore to face the inference that there ia a limit-
ation of the divine activity: that things occur 
15 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 410. 
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in the universe which are not due to God's will, 
though they must have happened with hie permission, 
that is through his self-limitation.l6 
It is possible, therefore, not:-~on.l,y,_. t~ affirm the metaphysical 
reality of evil, but also to affirm that reality in relation 
to the summum bonum. The conflict between good and evil is 
transcended in actual, concrete experience. The danger 
. 
involved here is that which results from the limitation of the 
power of value. Somehow the fact that value is not omnipotent 
goes against the common prejudice, but it should not. The 
facts of experience show us that value is limited by evil, but 
they also show us that value overcomes evil without disturbing 
the reality of the latter. This solution of the problem of 
value and evil depends upon our willingness to take ail the 
facts into consideration and fit them into a coherent whole. 
To den; the reality of evil is to evade the problem, for evil 
must be real while at the same time responsible to the highest 
value. 
16 Sorley, MVG, 461. 
=---=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-.:::!1=--=-==-=--=--=-::-::-=--===- -=-=-· ========= 
CHAPTER VIII 
VALUE AND EXISTENCE 
Passing now from the discussion of the reality of evil 
in relation to value, we shall consider the metaphysical exist-
ence of value. By metaphysical existence is meant being, or 
that which is. This is the broad definition of the term, but· 
it is limited as far as human experience is concerned. Any-
thing which exists for us must exist in our consciousness. 
Therefore, we must define existence as that which is in the 
space-time relation and a factor in our conscious experience. 
Does value possess a metaphysical existence of its own, and 
if it does, how is that existence conceived? Or if value 
does not exist, what is its relation to reality? This is the 
problem which underlies all the others we have been discussing. 
It is strictly metaphysical in nature and concerns the validity 
of including values in experience. We have been going further 
and further behind the experience of value until now we have 
reached the final question - do values exist? British philos-
ophers have given both affirmative and negative answers. These 
answers correspond closely to the division between subjective 
.\- and objective theories of value, although this need not be the 
case in every instance since reality may be construed in 
subjective terms. 
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Alexander has given us one of the most consistent and 
rational theories which deny the existence of value. Instead 
of making value exist, he makes it subsist. By subsistence 
he means that value is neither mental nor physical, but is a 
new relation which arises out of.the combination of these two 
factors. This relation he calls neutral being.l It is true 
he speaks of values as real, but for him subsistence is a part 
of reality. Speaking of values as tertiary qualities, he says: 
The tertiary qualities are not objective like the 
secondary ones, nor peculiar to mind and thus sub-jective like consciousness, nor are they like the 
primary qualities common both to subjects and 
objects. They are subject-object determinations.a 
In other words, they subsist. Existence is composed, for 
Alexander, of minds and objects. Values are a third category 
I which arises out of the combination of the parts of existence. 
I 
"Values then are unlike the empirical qualities of external 
things, shape, or fragrance, or life; they imply the amalgama-
tion of the object with the human appreciation of it."3 
Although Alexander denies the existence of values, he 
nevertheless makes them real. This he is able to do because 
he construes reality in such terms as to include subsistence 
(,e 1 Alexander, STD, Vol. I, 201. 
2 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 238. 
3 Loc. cit. 
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as well as existence. "The tertiary qualities, truth and 
goodness and beauty, though they differ from the secondary and 
primary ones in being creations of mind, are not the lese real." 
The objection to this point of view is that what he calls real 
is what other philosophers mean by existence. At least the 
idealists do not separate existence from reality as do such 
realists as Alexander, Holt, and Montague. What can be meant 
by reality other than existence it is impossible to say, and 
this leads us to the consideration of what Alexander means by 
tertiary qualities. 
We have already seen that they grow out of the union of 
mind with object. There are no values apart from this relation 
ship, but values are not merely this relationship. They are 
something beyond. It is our task to discover if we can what . I 
this subsistence really means. The task is impossible, however,! 
I because if these realists do mean something beyond a subject- 1 
object determination, they do not tell us what it is. We 
experience values as concrete and aapable of definition and 
description, so when Alexander makes value an essence apart 
from existence, we have the right to demand that he explain 
what that eeaenoe.ie. The moat that he can say about the (e character of value is the condition under which it arises. 
4 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 244. 
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"In every value there are two sides, the subject of valuation 
and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation 
between the two, and does not exist apart from them. n5 Yet 
the causes of a thing do not tell us much about the thing 
itself. Nor does the fact that value differs froru all other 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
external things help us very much. We must conclude, therefore,j 
that if value does subsist, it is a meaningless abstraction as 1 
such and quite beyond any of our purposes. This objection is 
fatal. 
The fallacy in Alexander's system lies in his postulat-
ing a separate existence out of a subject-object relationship. 
It is true, as we have previously noted, that all values are 
realized through a subject~object determination, and by this we 
mean that for us we are able to achieve value only in relation 
to an objective event, but this is no reason for taking that 
relation for more than it is. Alexander elevates it and says 
that it produces value. As soon as he does that, value becomes 
an essence with all of life strained out of it. To avoid this 
fallacy, we must simply accept the subject-object relatio~ as 
a condition for the realization of value as we experience it. 
It is a fact and not a cause. The truth in Alexander's 
~- system is just this. All of our conscious experience, whether 
5 Alexander, STD, Vol. II, 302. 
I 
I 
: 
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it be value or sense-experience, contains two factors, our 
consciousness and its content. This is as far as the facts 
tt' will let us go, and there is no need for postulating a separate 
essence. Such an abstract essence as Alexander constructs is 
no aid in understanding value. Value must exist if it is to 
have any meaning for us. 
The philosopher who has given the clearest account of 
how he conceives value to exist is W. R. Sorley. The basis 
for hie assertion he finds in an examination of experience. 
He discovers the fact that moral (value) experience is just as 
valid as sense-experience. Therefore, he takes this as hie 
start towards discovering the relation between value and 
reality. It must be noted that he identifies reality and 
existence and thus avoids the danger into which Alexander fell. 
In the first place, he says that value has no meaning unless 
we mean that it exists. "Thus, when we predicate value of any-
thing, we pass from the mere concept of essence of the thing, 
with its qualities, to a bearing which this essence has upon 
existence: it is worth existing or ought to be."6 The distinc-
tion is here drawn between value and qualities. Qualities may 
be predicated about something which does not exist, but that 
can never be done with values. 
6 Sorley, MVG, 77. 
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Sorley recognizes that this value which he is talking 
about is outside the scope of the natural sciences. Value is 
not a sense-experience, but is a real experience in another 
sense. Value is related to persons and thereby becomes real 
in the same sense as material facts are real. Therefore, 
"the notion of value always implies a relation to existence -
though a relation to which the natural sciences are indiffer-
ent."? Not content with this proof, Sorley pushes his 
argument still further and makes value even mmre real than 
sense experience~ The natural sciences are concerned only 
with the laws of causation, while value takes the whole of 
existence for its content. Thus value must exist if it is 
to be value at all. However, Sorley is careful to point out 
that all existence is not value, because if this were the case, 
there would be no sense in using the term value at all. It 
would be a tautology to say that reality had value. On the 
contrary, we always mean by such a statement that there is 
something distinctive about that part of reality which posaesse 
value. Therefore, value and reality are not identical. 
Another reason why the natural sciences are unable to 
perceive value is the fact that they deal only with the 
~ universals in experience, while value depends on the concrete 
7 Sorley, MVG, 78. 
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particular. There is no conflict, then, between natural 
science and a theory of value; the respective fields simply 
are not the same. In regard to this problem, Sorley says, 
"Value lies outside their scope because they are concerned 
with the universal and not with the individual, and the latter 
is the home of value.n8 However, this does not mean that in 
values there are no universal elements. Universals are neceee-
ary for the understanding of the particulars. This might be 
expressed differently by saying that no part can be understood 
apart from.ite context. Nevertheless, Sorley makes value the 
unique property of the individual. He does this in order to 
conform to the fact that value is a definite part of our 
experience and is not an abstraction as some charge. Hie 
view of reality, therefore, is in terms of a personalistic 
idealism. However, if universals are necessary, does not this 
indicate that the particulars are the content out of which the 
form of the universal is made? If this is the case, it is an 
error to say that value resides only in the particular; but 
form and content go together, and eo value is an element in 
both the uhivereal and the particular taken together. Since 
existence is both form and content, value, to conform to it, 
must be universal in form and particular in content. Sorley 
l~ overlooks the important fact that personality itself is a 
8 Sorley, MVG, 111. 
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unitas multiplex,9 and if value depends on personality, it 
must also contain tha universal as well aa the partmcular, for 
that is the structure of life. 
A third distinction between the reality of the facta of 
natural science and the values is that natural science deals 
with the realm of things while value is found only in persons. 
Intrinsic value belongs to persons, and extrinsic value belongs 
to things. Since Sorley decides that only intrinsic value can 
truly be called value inasmuch as extrinsic values only point 
the way towards intrinsic values, value is limited to the 
realm of conscious persons. He carefully avoids the pitfall 
of saying whether or not animals are conscious of value. He 
thinks that perhaps aome of them are, but we do not know, and 
that is as far as anyone can go at present. He meets a 
further objection to limiting value to personality which states 
that society is the home of some values by saying that there 
is no such thing as a community mmnd. Therefore, the only 
sense in which value is social is in the case of personal, 
individual values attainable only through society. Thus 
personality may be social, but only in this limited sense. 
"· •• There are human values which can be realized only in 
and by the society: which in this sense - if in this sense 
1 9 Stern, GP, 73. 
only- must be regarded as a person and a bearer of value.nlO 
The only meaning which we can assign to society is a group of 
individuals. 
Sorley grounds his whole theory of value in his emphasis 
upon the personal element involved. If persona are real, value 
is real because it is a part of personal experience. "We must 
take into account what we appreciate as well as what we 
apprehend- values as well as facts.nll Having once establishe 
this point, Sorley proceeds to link value with the whole of 
reality. The manner in which he does this is what we mean 
by his philosophical theory. His theory is called theism in 
religion and personalistic idealism in philosophy. The aware-
ness of value in our personal experience means that personality 
is basic in the universe, and value must be included in any 
coherent system. He therefore erects his system upon the fact 
of value in the universe, a faot which has been commonly over-
looked in the past. He thus makes reality consist of three 
distinct parts: persons, relations, and values. The latter is 
what receives special emphasis in his system because it has 
been disregarded so often. As regards the character of rela-
tions and values, he says, "Values are indeed similar to rela-
(~ tiona: as the latter are found in rebus, so the former are 
10 s or ley, MVG, 131. 
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1 al\vays manifested in personis. "12 The fact that values apply 
1
1 only to persons and relations to things means that each has 
(tt, its own method of validity, but they are both united by the 
criterion of coherence. Sorley does not try to make values 
apply to the whole of reality, which would result only in 
confusion as we saw above, so he limits value to personality. 
Things are neither good nor bad in themselves. Goodness 
(value) enters in only when the things are part of an action. 
Values are never static and are always in relation to a 
purpose. "They reveal purpose as well as order, and make 
possible a view of reality of the kind which has been described 
as an interpretation.nl3 
The cleavage which Sorley makes between things and values 
tends to ignore the importance of things to values. No 
matter what our conscious experience is, there must always be 
a subject-object relation. Alexander perceived this, but he 
distorted the facta by rearing his theory of the tertiary 
qualities upon them. Sorley goes to the other extreme and 
I separates values and things. This is unjustified because 
value does not have any content unless it is expressed in an 
action towards an object. Whenever we apeak of value, we 
12 Sorley, MVG, 231. 
13 Sorley, MVG, 289. 
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always include a concrete something. Unexpressed value is not 
value. Even purposive value must have an object. We do not 
mean simply that values interpenetrate, but they have a charac-
1 ter which requires an object, and that object is often a thing. 
Any value taken alone is meaningless, and an object without 
value is worthless. When we place the two together, however, 
we have a filled value experience. Truth, beauty, and goodness 
are terms for concrete experiences which we have, and every one 
of those experiences consists of a subject and an object. The 
tend:ency for idealism is to ignore the object since all reality 
is mental, but aside from the question of whether an object is 
menaal or non-mental, it certainly is other than my own 
evaluation. This is the point which Sorley fails to stress. 
According to Sorley, the logical end of value is God. 
The fact that values are conserved in the universe pointe to 
the fact that they must be preserved in God. Thus theism 
becomes the proper approach to any study of reality which is 
to include all the factors of experience. Sorley says: 
Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there 
also, as well as in moral goodness, we may see a 
manifestation of the divine. God must therefore be 
conceived as the formal home of values, the Supreme 
Worth - as possessing the fulness of knowledge and 
beauty and goodness and whatever else is of value 
for its own sake.l4 
14 Sorley, MVG, 467. 
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theistic position. 
The only way to deny Sorley 1 a conclusion is to deny 
the reality of value. It is for this reason that the problem 
of the relation of value to reality is eo important. On it 
must hinge our whole metaphysical theory. To deny logically 
and coherently the theistic position, one must deny that 
values are facta of our experience and possess true existence. 
However, this is impossible to do because, as Sorley says: 
At the same time the ethical idea is never without 
existential connections; and such connections have 
been already discovered to be of two kinds. In the 
first place, ethical ideas are facta of the personal 
consciousness, and they are realized through the will 
and in the character of persona. They have therefore 
a place in existent reality; they belong to that por-
tion of the universe which we call persona; and a 
theory of the universe cannot be complete which 
ignores their existence as facta and forces. In the 
second place, they claim objective validity; and this 
claim is not invalidated by their being conscious 
ideas, any more than the objective validity of any 
other kind of knowledge is affected by the fact that 
the process of knowing is a process in some one 1 a mind.l5 
To oppose Sorley's argument is to fall into two errore. The 
15 Sorley, MVG, 184 • 
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first is that if you deny-the validity of value, you must also 
deny personality, since value is a part of it. No one wants 
to do this, however. The second error is that if you deny the 
validity of value·, you must deny the validity of all knowledge, 
and then you have nothing left but solipsism. Accordingly, 
if there is anyr::meaning to life whatsoever, Sorley must be 
right in his affirmation that if we begin with the definition 
of value, we are led logically and empirically to the assertion 
of God 1 a existence. 
---------------------·----------·-----------------.... 
SUMMARY 
The problem of value has been inherent in philosophy 
from the very beginning, but only recently has it received 
separate treatment. The British and American schools of 
philosophy are now bringing out all the implications of the 
problem, especially as regards the objective statue of value. 
This renewed interest in value received ita impetus from such 
men as Munaterberg in Germany, and Meinong and Ehrenfela in 
Austria. As the inveati~ation into this problem progresses, it 
is bound to have an important effect upon both philosophy and 
religion. 
There is no common agreement among British philosophers 
concerning the definability of value. Although it would seem 
essential to have a definition of value, there are those who 
like G. E. Moore and John Laird think value is indefinable. 
Moore takes this position because he thinks value is a simple 
and cannot be discovered through analysis. Laird treats the 
problem very superficially since he does not feel that it is 
important, and eo he does not define value either. However, if 
we are to be able to recognize values, we must have some sort 
of a definition. Therefore, Bosanquet reverses Moore's method 
of analysis and by using synthesis defines value in terms of 
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the whole. In doing this, he fails to include in hie 
definition the values of the parts of the Absolute. Definition 
1 must therefore be in terms of both the whole and its parts. 
I 
I 
The problem of the normative character of value is not 
I so much a question of whether or not there is such a character 
i 
as what that character is. Values as we experience them seem 
to have a compelling force about them, and this oughtness is 
what must be explained. Laird confines the normative character 
to goodness, because as soon as we say we ought to pursue any 
value, the ought immediately makes it a matter of morals. This 
limitation of the ought category to goodness is arbitrary. We 
ought to seek truth, admire beauty, and worship God just as we 
ought to seek goodness. Moore treats this problem from the 
standpoint of logic and identifies the normative with the 
intxinsic character of value. However, when he tries to 
explain what he means by intrinsic, he admits the impossibility. 
He is forced to do this because of his conception of value as 
a simple notion. The denial of this normative character is 
implicit rather than explicit. Thus Alexander substitutes 
externality and universality in place of the ought category. 
However, these two factors neither exclude nor include all of 
what we experience as normative value. Therefore, it is valid (e to assert that value contains a norn•ative reference, because 
experience shows it to us. 
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The approaches to a theory of value are many and varied. 
G. E. Moore and Laird both approach the problem from the 
4t; standpoint of ethics, although Laird interprets goodness in a 
broader light. Boaanquet takes another approach and enters 
the problem through epia'temology, while Alexander takes the 
evolutionary viewpoint. All of these approaches have the 
basic weakness of being too narrow and excluding valid parte 
of experience. Sorley, however, illustrates the satisfactory 
approach which is more comprehensive, moral values. 
e 
Closely associated with the approaches to value is the 
summum bonum. Here is the goal of each theory. Laird follows 
the traditional classification and makes truth, beauty, and 
goodness the supreme values. Alexander aoea the same but 
conceives them in the abstract as tertiary qualities. Moore 
takes only one of this trilogy, goodness, and Boaanquet makes 
truth the summum bonum, while Mackenzie does the same for 
beauty. Sorley incorporates all of these in hie own theory and 
adds a fourth, religious values.' Hefollows this to ita 
logical conclusion and makes God the. supreme value. 
The problem of the objectivity of value is one of the 
·central problema. Alexander and Schiller represent the sub-
jective interpretation of value, but their position is untenabl 
either logically or empirically. The facta of experience point 
=-"--_---::_-_-___ dl~_~-,"-=-=--=-=--="=--=-=-==--=--=-=--=:-:::--=--=-=-=--------"-- . " 
towards an objective value: either as mental or extra-mental. 
Laird and Moore represent the latter type. For them value is 
apart from all mind. Their theory breaks down, however, 
because if value is extra-mental, then it cannot come into our 
conscious experience. Therefore, value must not only be 
objective but it must also be mental. Boaanquet fulfills this 
requirement in his Absolute, but he makes value impersonal. 
This violates our ezperience of value as related directly to 
ourselves as persona. Sorley presents the moat coherent theory 
when he argues for value as objective, mental, and personal. 
He uses the moral values as proof for the objective validity 
and reality of God in the universe. However, all value contains 
a subjective reference as well as an objective reality. 
One of the most effective means of arguing against value 
as objective is by presenting the facta of diavalue in the 
universe. These facta of evil must be met if idealism and 
theism are to validate their claims. Bosanquet recognizes the 
presence of evil, but he denies it reality on the ground that 
logically.it is self-contradictory. However, disvalue as we 
experience it is always in the concrete and cannot thus be 
explained away in the a~atract. Laird, Moore, Alexander, and 
Sorley all recognize this fact and attempt to treat evil 
squarely and fairly. Sorley is especially firm on this point, 
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by means of divine self-limitation. No theory which ignores 
the presence of disvalue can be coherent and complete, nor 
can it claim to be valid unless it takes these facts into 
account. 
British philosophers have both denied and affirmed the 
existence of value. Alexander is one of those who deny it, for 
he says that value subsists rather than exists. His theory 
fails, however, because it cannot explain this subsistence as 
postulated in the tertiary qualities. Sorley accepts the view 
that value exists and proves it by showing that the facta of 
" value-experience are as valid, if not more so, as the facta 
I 
with which science treats. He thereby places value on a firm 
footing, but in so doing he overlooks the relation between 
values and things. However, he is correct in his conclusion 
that any experience of value leads to an affirmation of God 
as the Supreme Value and an objective reality. The dialectic 
of desire always pushes our research higher and higher until 
we reach God, the home of all values. 
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